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MARYLAND’S “WAL-MART” ACT:
POLICY AND PREEMPTION
Edward A. Zelinsky*

INTRODUCTION
In response to negotiations to bring a Wal-Mart regional
distribution center to Maryland,1 that state’s legislature passed, over
gubernatorial veto, a statute mandating that Wal-Mart expend a
minimum percentage of its Maryland payroll on health care for WalMart’s Maryland employees. The Maryland law is scheduled to take
effect on January 1, 2007 and has spurred interest in similar legislation
in other states.
The Maryland statute raises two fundamental questions: Is the
statute legal? Does the statute represent sound policy? I write to
explore both of these questions.
With respect to the legality of the Maryland statute, I conclude that
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2
preempts the Maryland law. I thus agree with the recent decision of
Judge Motz of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland,
holding Maryland’s Wal-Mart Act to be ERISA-preempted.3

* Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law;
Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, Professor
Zelinsky thanks Attorneys Debra A. Davis, Alvin D. Lurie and Chantel Sheaks; Professors Eric
D. Chason, Jonathan Barry Forman, John H. Langbein, Paul M. Secunda, and James A. Wooten;
Doris Zelinsky, Joshua Zelinsky (Yale College class of 2007) and Aaron Zelinsky (Yale Law
School class of 2010); and Catherine Murray and Megan Burrows (both Cardozo class of 2006).
Professor Zelinsky has no financial or other ties to Wal-Mart or to opponents or supporters of the
Act (though, at any moment, it is possible that one of the mutual funds in Professor Zelinsky’s
403(b) accounts holds Wal-Mart stock). Professor Zelinsky has received no financial or other
assistance or encouragement from Wal-Mart or the Act’s opponents or supporters.
1 See Mike Billington & Patrick Jackson, Md. Health Care Requirements Could Send WalMart to Del.; Benefits Wouldn’t Cost as Much in First State, NEWS J., Jan. 23, 2006, at 1A.
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
3 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006). In
addition to the ERISA preemption issue, District Judge Motz addressed the procedural questions
of standing and ripeness, the jurisdictional import of the Federal Tax Injunction Act, and the
substantive status of the Wal-Mart Act under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. My analysis focuses only on the ERISA preemption question.
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Since, as a matter of federalism, I favor state experimentation as to
medical care, I regret this outcome on normative grounds. Maryland (or
any other state) should be free to experiment in this area. However,
under any of the plausible approaches to ERISA preemption, ERISA
Section 514(a), as a matter of law, preempts the Maryland statute and
others like it.
As a matter of policy, the Maryland statute is ill-conceived. The
Maryland statute raises prices on Wal-Mart’s predominantly lowincome customers and, for the long-run, will reduce Wal-Mart’s
employment. Maryland, and other states, have far more compelling
options for assisting low-income workers including expansion of state
earned income tax credits. While states should be free to experiment,
the Maryland statute, even if it passed muster under ERISA, would not
be a compelling experiment.
In the final analysis, Maryland’s Wal-Mart Act is a poorlydesigned exercise in political symbolism, rather than a carefully-crafted
response to the pressing problem of health care in America.
I. THE MARYLAND ACT
Maryland’s Wal-Mart statute is formally denoted the “Fair Share
Health Care Fund Act”4 and nominally5 covers all non-governmental
employers with 10,000 or more employees in the State of Maryland.6
Substantively,7 the Act provides that, if a covered employer operates on
a for-profit basis, the employer, as of January 1, 2007, must spend on
“health insurance costs” an amount equal to at least “8% of the total
wages paid” to the employer’s Maryland employees.8 If a covered
employer is “a nonprofit organization,” the Act provides that the
employer must spend on health insurance an amount equal to at least six
percent of the total wages paid to the employer’s Maryland employees.9
If a covered employer fails to spend the required amount on health
insurance, the Act obligates the employer to pay to the Maryland Fair
Share Health Care Fund10 the difference between the employer’s actual
4 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to
107(West 2006)).
5 In practice, the Act is aimed at a single employer: Wal-Mart. See infra note 14 and
accompanying text.
6 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act § 1.
7 As a procedural matter, the Act requires that employers report on their payrolls and their
outlays for health insurance costs and that summary reports be sent to the Governor and General
Assembly. Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-101(h) (West 2006) (defining the
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health insurance outlays and the employer’s statutorily-required health
insurance outlays. The Fund, in turn, helps to finance the Maryland’s
Employers are
Medicaid program for low-income residents.11
specifically forbidden from deducting from their employees’ wages the
employers’ statutorily-mandated payments to the Fair Share Health
Care Fund.12
While the Act raises several interpretative issues,13 the import of
the Act is clear: A covered employer must either devote a minimum
percentage of total payroll to employee health care or must pay the
shortfall to the Fund financing Maryland’s Medicaid program. Equally
clear is the target of the Act: Wal-Mart. In practice (and everyone
acknowledges this), the Maryland Act “applies only to one employer in
the state—Wal-Mart Stores Inc.—because the other employers” covered
by the Act “already provide [health] benefits that cost them more than
8% of payroll.”14 The adoption of the Act in Maryland has spurred
“program” as the “Maryland Medical Assistance Program”).
11 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-103.
12 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act § 1.
13 For example, the Act counts as part of an employer’s health insurance outlays the
employer’s contributions to medical savings accounts, now technically labeled by the Internal
Revenue Code as Archer Medical Savings Accounts. However, under the Internal Revenue
Code, such accounts are limited to small employers, i.e., those with fifty or fewer employees.
Thus, no covered employer under the Act (with 10,000 or more Maryland employees) could ever
contribute to a medical savings account. Moreover, no new medical savings accounts can be
established after December 31, 2005. An employer covered by the Maryland Act can contribute
to health savings accounts, which are not limited to small employers. However, such health
savings accounts are not referenced by the Act. Id. (counting contributions to medical savings
accounts as “health insurance costs” and limiting the coverage of the Act to employers “with
10,000 or more employees in” Maryland); see also I.R.C. § 220(c) (2000) (restricting Archer
Medical Savings Accounts to employees of small employers); id. § 220(i) (prohibiting the
establishment of new medical savings accounts after December 31, 2005); id. § 223 (no
equivalent restrictions on health savings accounts).
Another curious feature of the Act is the discrepancy between the Act’s reporting
requirements and its substantive mandate. When reporting under the Act, a covered employer
may exclude from its reported wages both wages paid in an amount above Maryland’s median
household income and wages paid to an employee enrolled in or eligible to enroll in Medicare.
However, as a substantive matter, a covered employer is obligated to pay as health care outlays a
minimum percentage of “total wages” without these exclusions. Compare MD. CODE ANN., LAB.
& EMPL. § 8.5-103 (listing wage exclusions for reporting purposes), with MD. CODE ANN., LAB.
& EMPL. § 8.5-104 (using “total wages” as base for determining compliance with the Act).
It is widely believed that the special definition of wages in Section 8.5-103 removes
Northrop Grumman from the coverage of the Act. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler
(RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (D. Md. 2006) (“This exclusion permits Northrop Grumman to
meet the requirement.”). However, a careful reading of the Act suggests that, if this was the
Maryland legislature’s intent, it did not quite embody that intent in the actual statute.
Presumably these and other similar issues will be addressed by technical corrections
legislation or regulations. In the meantime, these interpretative issues do not impair the Act’s
basic message: Wal-Mart must either increase its medical insurance outlays as a percentage of
total wages paid to Maryland employees or it must pay the shortfall to the Fund to support
Maryland’s Medicaid program.
14 Joanne Wojcik, “Wal-Mart Bill” Spurs Coverage Mandates, BUS. INS., Jan. 23, 2006, at 1;
see also Letter from J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Md. Attorney Gen., to Michael E. Busch, Speaker of
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interest in similar legislation in other states15 as well as litigation
challenging the Act.16 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland has held the Maryland Act to be ERISA-preempted.17 The
Attorney General of Maryland has appealed that decision to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.18
II. DOES ERISA PREEMPT THE MARYLAND ACT?
ERISA’s preemption clause, ERISA Section 514(a), demonstrates
how a seemingly straightforward statute can engender enormous legal
controversy. With beguiling simplicity, Section 514(a) provides that
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any” pension or welfare plan governed by
ERISA.19 For ERISA purposes, employers’ arrangements for their
the Md. House, at 2 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/
Advice2006/busch06.pdf#search=%22attorney%20general%20of%20maryland%20busch%20fair
%20share%20act%22 [hereinafter Attorney General’s Letter] (observing that only three Maryland
employers have more than 10,000 in-state employees and that “[o]f these three, only Wal-Mart
has health insurance costs low enough to be subject to the payroll assessment.”). While the
Attorney General identifies Wal-Mart, Johns Hopkins University, and Giant Foods as the three
employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees, there is apparently a fourth such employer,
Northrop Grumman. See RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
15 Karen Setze, Many States Consider ‘Fair Share’ Healthcare Bills; Few Enacted, ST. TAX
TODAY, July 14, 2006, at 135-1;. see also Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart to Expand Health Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at C1 (“[A] dozen other states, including California, Colorado and
Rhode Island, are considering similar bills.”); Deloitte Wash. Bulletin, Feb. 27, 2006, at 2-3
(citing the National Conference of State Legislatures for the proposition that legislation similar to
the Maryland Act is “pending in twenty states”); Danny Hakim et al., Wal-Mart Looms Over 2
Bills To Improve Worker Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at B1 (“The national effort to
force Wal-Mart and other employers to provide better health care coverage came to Albany on
Tuesday . . . .”); Ritu Kalra, Wal-Mart Faults Health Insurance Idea, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb.
17, 2006, at E1 (legislation similar to the Maryland Act introduced in Connecticut and defeated in
New Hampshire and Washington); Andy Miller, Health Bill Targets Wal-Mart: State’s Soaring
Costs Cited, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 14, 2006, at C1 (legislation similar to Maryland Act
introduced in Georgia). The California legislature passed a “near clone” of the Maryland WalMart Act. See Karen Setze, California Lawmakers OK Measure Similar to Maryland’s “WalMart Bill,” ST. TAX TODAY, Sept. 5, 2006, at 171-19. This bill was vetoed by Governor
Schwarzenegger. See Karen Setze, California Governor Vetoes Healthcare Requirement for
Large Employers, ST. TAX TODAY, Sept. 19, 2006, at 181-2.
16 See RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 481; Miller, supra note 15 (discussing the lawsuit filed by the
Retail Industry Leaders Association against the Maryland Act); Deloitte, supra note 15 (same);
see also Karen Setze, Judge Hears Oral Arguments in Suit Against Maryland’s ‘Wal-Mart Bill,’
ST. TAX TODAY, June 23, 2006, at 122-18.
17 RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 489-92.
18 Karen Setze, Maryland Attorney General Appeals ‘Wal-Mart Bill’ Ruling, ST. TAX
TODAY, July 24, 2006, at 142-13.
19 The plans “established or maintained” by virtually all non-governmental, non-church
employers are covered by ERISA. In particular, Wal-Mart’s medical plans are ERISA-regulated.
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 4, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
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employees’ medical coverage are “welfare plans,” subject to the
strictures of ERISA.20 Thus, state laws “relat[ing] to” employers’
ERISA-regulated medical plans are, per Section 514(a), preempted.
Despite the apparent simplicity of Section 514(a), in practice, the
task of construing Section 514(a) has been anything but simple:
“[R]elate to” has proved to be an elusive legal standard. However,
under any of the plausible approaches to Section 514, that section
preempts the Maryland Act. The Fourth Circuit should accordingly
affirm the District Court’s decision holding the Act to be ERISApreempted.
A.

Shaw

During ERISA’s early history, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted
the language of Section 514(a) capaciously,21 striking a host of state
laws under Section 514(a) on the grounds that such state laws had “a
connection with or reference to” ERISA-governed pension or welfare
plans.22 Under this expansive approach to Section 514(a) and its “relate
to” terminology, ERISA preemption was nearly automatic whenever a
state law touched an ERISA-regulated plan. The Court first articulated
its broad understanding of Section 514(a) in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. by striking as ERISA-preempted a New York State law which
mandated that employers provide pregnancy disability benefits to their
employees.23 Under this broad understanding of Section 514(a), ERISA
preempts the Maryland Act by referring to and connecting with covered
employers’ ERISA-governed medical plans. The health care outlays
regulated by the Maryland Act necessarily entail such plans while the
employer’s liability under the Act can be determined only by
considering the covered employer’s payments pursuant to such plans.
Typical of the expansive, Shaw-based approach to Section 514(a)
(and particularly instructive as to the Maryland Act) is the last case of
the Shaw line, District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of
Trade.24
The District of Columbia had amended its workers’
compensation law to require employers maintaining health care
coverage for their current employees to also provide equivalent
20 ERISA § 3(1)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)) (ERISA-regulated welfare
plans include any employer “plan, fund, or program” providing “medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits” “through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.”).
21 This capacious understanding of Section 514(a) is discussed in Edward A. Zelinsky,
Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 807, 815-27 (1999).
22 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
23 Id.
24 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
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coverage for injured former employees eligible for workers’
compensation payments. Following the capacious interpretation of
Section 514(a) announced in Shaw, the Court struck the D.C. law as
impermissibly “relat[ing] to” employers’ medical plans and as thus
ERISA-preempted.
For eight Justices, Washington Board of Trade was an easy case,
controlled by “the ordinary meaning of ‘relate to’” determinable from
the dictionary.25
Since the D.C. workers’ compensation law
“specifically refers to welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA,” i.e.,
employers’ medical plans for their current employees, “on that basis
alone” the D.C. law is preempted.26
Moreover, the Court observed, it is of no moment whether a
challenged state law is “specifically designed to affect” ERISAregulated plans or whether the challenged state law has an effect on
such plans which “is only indirect.”27 By the same token, a state law is
ERISA-preempted if it refers to or has a connection with an ERISAregulated plan even if the challenged state “law is ‘consistent with
ERISA’s substantive requirements.’”28
Under the original, Shaw-based understanding of Section 514(a) as
applied in Washington Board of Trade, Section 514(a) preempts the
Maryland Act since the Act refers to and has a connection with covered
employers’ medical programs for their employees. Indeed, the Act
intrudes directly upon such plans, mandating the minimum level of
covered employers’ outlays for their employees’ medical coverage. The
medical care expenditures regulated by the Maryland Act necessarily
entail ERISA-governed employer plans while the employer’s
obligations under the Act can be assessed only by taking into account
the employer’s payments pursuant to such plans.
Consider initially the Act’s definitions of “health insurance costs:”
“Health insurance costs” means the amount paid by an employer to
provide health care or health insurance to employees in the State to
the extent the costs may be deductible by an employer under federal
tax law.29
“Health insurance costs” includes payments for medical care,
prescription drugs, vision care, medical savings accounts, and any
other costs to provide health benefits as defined in Section 213(d) of
the Internal Revenue Code.30
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.
Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)).
Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3, § 1 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to
107) (West 2006)).
30 Id.
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These definitions of “insurance costs” sweep far more broadly than
insurance to include any “health care” expense which is deductible for
federal income tax purposes. In particular, an employer’s self-funded
health care outlays from the employer’s general assets count as
“insurance costs” under the Act. Thus, the Act’s term “insurance costs”
is quite inelegant;31 more accurately, that term encompasses the totality
of the covered employer’s health care outlays for its employees.32
In light of these definitions, whether a covered employer has
complied with the Act can only be ascertained with reference to the
employer’s ERISA-regulated health care plans for its employees. The
Act defines “health insurance costs” as the health care expenditures
made pursuant to such plans. In this respect, the Maryland Act is like
the D.C. workers’ compensation law struck as ERISA-preempted in
Washington Board of Trade. The D.C. law referred to the employer’s
programs for employee health care to determine the level of medical
coverage required for injured former employees. Similarly, the
Maryland Act refers to the employer’s outlays for employee health care
to determine if the statutory minimum health care outlay has been
satisfied. In Washington Board of Trade, the Supreme Court declared
that the former reference triggers Section 514(a) and ERISA
preemption. If that remains the test, then the similar reference under the
Maryland statute to employers’ health care outlays likewise results in
ERISA preemption of the Act.
Moreover, as a substantive matter, the Maryland Act intrudes
deeply upon the operations of the covered employer’s ERISA-regulated
medical plans. Under the D.C. workers’ compensation law, the
employer’s medical arrangements for its employees merely served as a
touchstone, a yardstick with which to measure the health coverage the
employer owed to former employees receiving workers’ compensation
payments. That connection between employers’ medical plans and the
D.C. law was enough to trigger ERISA preemption under the expansive
Shaw standard.
On the other hand, the Maryland Act constitutes a substantive
regulation of the covered employer’s medical plan, a statutory directive
either to expend a minimum percentage of payroll for medical coverage
or to contribute the shortfall to the Fund. If the D.C. law, which
referred to but did not regulate employers’ medical plans, is ERISApreempted, a fortiori the Maryland Act, which both refers to and
regulates such plans, is ERISA-preempted.
31 As discussed infra, this inelegance may not be accidental but, rather, may be an
unpersuasive effort to qualify the Act as insurance regulation, exempted from preemption under
ERISA § 514(b). See infra Part II.D.
32 This observation proves particularly important when considering whether the Maryland
Act survives ERISA preemption as an insurance regulation. See infra Part II.D.
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In this context, District Judge Motz’s observation is compelling:
“The reference in the Fair Share Act to ERISA plans is direct and
express.”33
In contrast to my analysis and Judge Motz’s conclusion,
Maryland’s Attorney General argues that ERISA does not preempt the
Act because, he contends, the Act “does not specifically refer to
employee welfare benefit plans.” Rather, the Attorney General asserts,
the Maryland Act refers to the covered employer’s health care outlays
including outlays made “outside the structure of a plan.”34 ERISA
Section 514(a) only preempts state laws insofar as such laws “relate to”
employers’ benefit plans, not insofar as such laws relate to employers’
benefit outlays. Hence, the Attorney General concludes, the Act, which
regulates employer outlays but not employer plans, survives a
preemption challenge under Section 514(a).
For four reasons, the Attorney General’s approach to Section
514(a) and the Act is unpersuasive. First, that approach eviscerates the
Court’s ERISA preemption case law, rendering ERISA preemption
easily avoidable through the semantic expedient of framing state
regulation in terms of employers’ outlays. Second, under the statute,
regulations, and case law, medical expenditures by an employer like
Wal-Mart necessarily entail the kind of ongoing commitment which
constitutes a “plan, fund, or program” for ERISA purposes. Third, WalMart can determine its compliance with the Act and calculate any
amount owed to the Fund only by considering each ERISA-regulated
medical plan Wal-Mart maintains for its employees. Finally, even if the
Act does not refer to the covered employer’s ERISA-regulated medical
plans, the Act has a connection with such plans since, as just noted, only
by considering such plans can the employer determine whether it has
complied with the Act and, if not, the amount owed to the Fund, i.e.,
eight percent of payroll minus the employer’s outlays to its employee
health care plans.
As an initial matter, the Attorney General’s argument proves too
much. Indeed, the Attorney General’s interpretation of Section 514(a)
eviscerates much of the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption case law,
rendering ERISA preemption a mere matter of the verbiage deployed by
the state.
Take, for example, Shaw, under which the Court struck as ERISApreempted the New York State law mandating pregnancy disability
benefits. Under the Maryland Attorney General’s approach to Section
514(a), New York could mandate such benefits merely by getting the
semantics right. All New York need do is phrase its requirement in
33 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 494 n.12 (D. Md.
2006).
34 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 2-3.
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terms of mandated employer outlays, e.g., “any employer making
disability outlays must make outlays for pregnancy-related disabilities.”
According to the Attorney General, this verbal formulation makes the
ERISA preemption problem disappear.
Washington Board of Trade becomes a similarly sterile exercise in
semantics under the Attorney General’s theory of ERISA preemption.
Under that theory, the District of Columbia’s requirement can be
reframed in terms of employers’ expenditures for medical insurance,
e.g., “any employer making medical expenditures for employees must
also make medical expenditures for injured former employees.” In this
case also, ERISA preemption is again overcome as ERISA preemption
is merely a matter of the proper verbal formula, that is, referring to
employer outlays rather than to employer plans.
Second, contra the Attorney General’s position, for an employer
like Wal-Mart, employer expenditures for medical coverage necessarily
entail the existence of a plan to implement ongoing coverage. The legal
threshold for finding an ERISA welfare plan is low. Consequently, the
health care expenses regulated by the Act necessarily imply the
existence of one or more ERISA-regulated plans to undertake those
expenses.
As a statutory matter, ERISA broadly defines a welfare “plan” as
any “plan, fund, or program” that provides one or more of the kinds of
benefits specified by the statute.35 Medical coverage is among these
specified benefits. How can an employer like Wal-Mart provide
medical coverage for its employees without, implicitly or explicitly,
having a “plan, fund, or program” for such coverage?
If an employer spontaneously pays an employee’s medical
expenses from the employer’s general assets, that isolated payment
would not constitute an ERISA-regulated plan. However, short of that
kind of isolated ad hoc outlay, employer expenses for employees’
medical care involve some kind of “program.”
Some have suggested that Wal-Mart, as the covered employer
under the Act, could designate year-end bonuses as “health care
bonuses” without thereby creating an ERISA plan for medical care.36 If
this is done once on a spontaneous basis, perhaps so. However, under
the statute, it takes little to turn this practice into an employer program
for ERISA purposes. If the employer designates year-end payments as
“health care bonuses” for a second year, the employer thereby
demonstrates that it has a “program” to do so. And, in any event, such
35 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(1), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000)).
36 David B. Brandolph, Preemption: Challenge to Maryland “Wal-Mart” Law Provokes
Debate Among ERISA Experts, 33 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 570 (Feb. 28, 2006) (quoting
attorney Marc I. Machiz).
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year-end bonuses would not constitute “health insurance costs” within
the meaning of the Maryland Act since those bonuses would not
reimburse for specific health care outlays and since the employees could
spend such bonuses as they see fit.37
It has also been suggested38 that an employer’s payments to health
savings accounts (HSAs) would not constitute a “plan” for ERISA
purposes.39 The Department of Labor (DOL) has indicated otherwise.40
If an employer, pursuant to the relevant regulations,41 merely collects
employees’ voluntary contributions “through payroll deductions” and
remits these employee contributions “without endorsing the program”
or itself contributing to the health savings accounts, no ERISA plan
exists.42 However, if the employer leaves this narrow safe-harbor—by
endorsing the HSA program, by contributing its own funds to the
employees’ accounts or by paying the premiums for the high deductible
health coverage to which HSAs must be linked43—the employer
establishes an ERISA-regulated plan. And, if Wal-Mart does not leave
the regulatory safe-harbor by contributing its own funds, Wal-Mart has
not paid any “health insurance costs” within the meaning of the
Maryland Act.
The import of the controlling case law is the same, namely, that
employer “health insurance costs” within the meaning of the Act
necessarily entail an ERISA-governed medical plan. To buttress his
argument that the Act escapes ERISA preemption, Maryland’s Attorney
General cites Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne44 and argues that
employers may make “health care expenditures” which are not “part of
a plan.”45 However, a careful review of Fort Halifax confirms that,
except in the rarest of cases, employer expenditures for medical
coverage necessarily imply the existence of an ERISA-regulated “plan,
fund, or program” to make such continuing expenditures.
37 Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to 107
(West 2006)). The Act’s definitions of “health insurance costs” would not include a year-end
bonus that does not reimburse for specific medical outlays and which the employee can spend for
non-medical purposes.
38 Brandolph, supra note 36. For the reasons indicated in the text, Judge Motz of the U.S.
District Court correctly rejected the claim that a covered firm could comply with the Act via
HSAs that do not constitute an ERISA-regulated plan. RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 491-92.
39 Such payments to health savings accounts would not count as “health insurance costs” for
purposes of the Act. See supra note 13.
40 See Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of Labor, Op. No. 2004-09 A
(Dec. 22, 2004) [hereinafter EBSA Op. No. 2004-09 A].
41 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (2006).
42 EBSA Op. No. 2004-09 A, supra note 40.
43 See I.R.C. § 223(c) (2000) (an individual is eligible for an HSA only if such individual is
“covered under a high deductible health plan”).
44 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
45 See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 3.
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The Fort Halifax Court sustained against an ERISA preemption
challenge “a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time
severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing.”46 In
this context, the Court held, there was no employer plan within the
meaning of ERISA. According to the Court, a welfare plan exists “with
respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires an ongoing
administrative program to meet the employer’s obligation.”47 In
contrast, the Maine law requiring employers to pay severance payments
on plant closings imposed a contingent obligation for the employer to
make a single outlay:
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an employer to
maintain, an employee benefit plan. The requirement of a one-time,
lump-sum payment triggered by a single event requires no
administrative scheme whatsoever to meet the employer’s obligation.
The employer assumes no responsibility to pay benefits on a regular
basis, and thus faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a
need for financial coordination and control. Rather, the employer’s
obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency
that may never materialize. The employer may well never have to
pay the severance benefits.48

An employer like Wal-Mart, with at least 10,000 Maryland
employees, can provide medical care for those employees only by
accepting continuing “responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis”
with the attendant “demands on its assets,” i.e., by having a plan. For a
firm like Wal-Mart, the provision of ongoing medical benefits “by
nature” implies the existence of a plan within the meaning of ERISA.
Consequently, the Maryland Act refers to such a plan when it defines
and regulates “health insurance costs.”
In short, the concept of “nonplan” medical expenditures by an
employer like Wal-Mart is unpersuasive under ERISA’s statutory
terminology, the relevant regulations interpreting that terminology, and
the Supreme Court case that the Maryland Attorney General himself
cites as authoritative.
Third, the Maryland Act requires Wal-Mart to monitor continually
its health care outlays and to report annually the level of those outlays
as a percentage of Wal-Mart’s Maryland payroll.49 Unless Wal-Mart
makes absolutely no health care expenditures for its Maryland
employees and pays the entire eight percent of payroll to the Maryland
Fair Share Health Care Fund, Wal-Mart’s obligations under the Act
46
47
48
49

Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 3.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to 107
(West 2006)).

858

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

must be determined with reference to every “plan, fund or program”
Wal-Mart maintains for its workforce. Even if an employer like WalMart can make contingent, one-time “nonplan” medical outlays for its
employees (a premise of which I am skeptical), the employer’s
obligation under the Maryland Act is determined by a calculation that
offsets against eight percent of payroll any outlays to the plans under
which Wal-Mart provides employee medical coverage.
Finally, even if the Attorney General correctly reads the Act as
not referring to the covered employer’s medical plans for its employees,
the Act in the alternative has a “connection with” such plans since, as
just observed, the employer’s liability under the Act can only be
assessed by comparing eight percent of the employer’s Maryland
payroll with the employer’s outlays under any medical plans the
employer maintains for its Maryland employees.
To summarize: Under the initial, expansive approach to Section
514(a) and its “relate to” clause announced in Shaw, the Maryland Act
is ERISA-preempted for two reasons. The Act is preempted since it
refers to employers’ health care outlays pursuant to their ERISAregulated medical plans. Moreover, the Act, on its face, connects with
employers’ ERISA-regulated medical plans.
The health care
expenditures regulated by the Maryland Act necessarily entail such
plans while the employer’s obligations under the Act can be ascertained
only by considering the covered employer’s payments pursuant to such
plans.
B.

Travelers

Ultimately, the Court’s original, Shaw-based approach to Section
514(a) points to ERISA preemption without discernible limit. Justice
Scalia captured the core of the problem when he noted that “as many a
curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything
else.”50 From that vantage, the statutory term “relate to,” unless
somehow cabined, is virtually limitless and Section 514(a) consequently
preempts whatever it touches: An employer’s health care plan which
refuses to pay rent to its landlord can plausibly resist eviction on the
ground that, in this context, the state eviction statute relates to an
ERISA-governed plan.
This is a result most would consider
unacceptable, though the Court’s expansive, Shaw-based case law
points to such ERISA preemption without discernible limits.51

50 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
51 Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 815-27.
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Confronted with the problematic consequences of its initial,
capacious approach to Section 514(a), the Supreme Court contracted its
construction of Section 514(a). The critical decision in the retreat from
the broad Shaw standard was New York State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.52 Under this more
restrained approach to Section 514(a) and its “relate to” language,
ERISA still preempts the Maryland Act because the Act impacts,
directly and acutely, upon the structure and administration of the
covered employer’s medical plans.
Travelers involved an ERISA preemption challenge to New York
State’s regulatory scheme, imposing upon hospital patients surcharges
for their respective hospital stays. The surcharges varied depending
upon the source of payment for the hospitalization. If a hospitalization
was financed by Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance, no surcharge was
added to the bill for the hospital stay. If, on the other hand, a selffunded employer plan paid for the hospitalization from the employer’s
own assets, a surcharge applied to the hospital’s fees. Similarly, if
privately-purchased or employer-supplied commercial insurance paid
for a New York hospitalization, a surcharge applied to the hospital’s
fees. Likewise, if the patient himself paid for his hospitalization from
his own resources, a surcharge was added to the patient’s bill.
The evident economic effect of the New York regulation was to
incent employers maintaining medical coverage for their employees to
use Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance (rather than commercial insurance
or self-funding) to avoid the hospital surcharges.
Given the breadth of ERISA preemption under the Shaw line of
cases, it is unsurprising that the Second Circuit struck the surcharge
scheme as unacceptably “relat[ing] to” employers’ ERISA-regulated
medical plans.53 However, the Supreme Court reversed and sustained
the New York surcharge scheme in a way which, decisively albeit not
openly, departed from the Court’s prior case law under Section 514(a).
Many of the Shaw-based preemption decisions, the Travelers Court
stated, “pre-empted state laws that mandated employee benefit
structures or their administration.”54 In contrast, the New York hospital
surcharge scheme was merely “[a]n indirect economic influence”55 on
the choice made by ERISA-regulated medical plans, i.e., to self-fund, to
use commercial insurance, or to purchase Blue Cross/Blue Shield
coverage. Moreover, Congress did not intend for ERISA “to displace
52 514 U.S. 645 (1995); see also Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed
Care, and How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 488 (2003)
(“In 1995, after years of criticism of its broad preemption doctrine, the Supreme Court scaled
back ERISA’s preemptive effect in [Travelers].”).
53 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1993).
54 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658.
55 Id. at 659.
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general health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of
local concern.”56 And, the Travelers Court continued, preemption
doctrine has traditionally started from the “presumption that Congress
does not intend to supplant state law.”57 From these premises, the
Travelers Court sustained the New York surcharge scheme as that
scheme applied to ERISA-regulated welfare arrangements, that is, to
employers’ medical plans for their employees.
Had the Travelers Court been writing on a blank slate, none of this
would have been remarkable. However, in light of the Shaw line of
cases, this approach to Section 514(a) and its “relate to” clause was
remarkable indeed—though the Court itself did not acknowledge fully
the extent to which Travelers represents a break from the cases which
preceded it. While the Court did not advertise Travelers as departing
from Shaw and its progeny, the cases tell a different story. Since
Travelers, the Court has been far more likely than before to sustain state
laws challenged as ERISA-preempted.58
As I suggest below,59 the Court’s more restrained approach to
Section 514(a) under Travelers is not wholly persuasive, given the text
and structure of Section 514. However, for the Maryland Act, the
critical point is that, even under this more restrained understanding of
ERISA preemption, Section 514(a) preempts the Act. For these
purposes, the key post-Travelers decision is Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,60 a
decision on which Judge Motz relied heavily and, I think,
persuasively.61 Egelhoff indicates that, even after Travelers, Section
514(a) carries enormous preemptive force as to state laws like the Act
that affect the benefits provided by ERISA-regulated welfare
arrangements and that impair the nationally uniform administration of
such welfare arrangements.
In Egelhoff, the U.S. Supreme Court struck on ERISA preemption
grounds a Washington State law stating that divorce revokes any
outstanding beneficiary designation of a former spouse as to nonprobate property. Mr. Egelhoff was an employee of Boeing, which
provided life insurance coverage for Boeing employees’ designated
56
57
58

Id. at 661 (citation omitted).
Id. at 654.
Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 827-39. For discussion of later post-Travelers cases, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights—The Sequel, 635 N.Y.U. REV.
EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-1 (2005) [hereinafter Zelinksy, Sequel]; Edward
A. Zelinsky, Against A Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L. & POL. REV. 443 (2003)
[hereinafter Zelinsky, Against]; Edward A. Zelinsky, Pegram and Preemption: Patients’ Rights
and the Case for Doing Nothing, 88 TAX NOTES 1053 (2000) [hereinafter Zelinksy, Pegram].
59 See discussion infra Part II.C.
60 532 U.S. 141 (2001). For discussion of Egelhoff, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff,
ERISA Preemption and the Conundrum of the ‘Relate To’ Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917 (2001).
61 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 490 (D. Md.
2006).
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beneficiaries. Like an employer’s medical coverage for its employees,
this type of employer-provided death benefit constitutes an ERISAregulated welfare plan.62 Mr. Egelhoff divorced his spouse who had
previously been named as the beneficiary of his Boeing-provided life
insurance. Mr. Egelhoff then died without changing this designation.
Consequently, the former Mrs. Egelhoff received the life insurance
proceeds pursuant to her deceased husband’s pre-divorce designation.
Mr. Egelhoff’s children from a prior marriage subsequently sued to
obtain the insurance proceeds from the former Mrs. Egelhoff. The
Egelhoff children invoked the Washington State statute providing that
divorce revokes any beneficiary designation of the now former but
previously-designated spouse. Mrs. Egelhoff defended against the
claim of her former husband’s children by asserting that Section 514(a)
preempts the Washington statute as to Boeing’s ERISA-regulated life
insurance plan for Boeing employees, thus leaving the pre-divorce
beneficiary designation in effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the former Mrs. Egelhoff that
Section 514(a) preempts the Washington statute as it applies to
employer-provided plans governed by ERISA. The Washington statute,
the Egelhoff Court observed, impermissibly intrudes upon “an area of
core ERISA concern,”63 namely, the primacy of plan documents. Since
Mrs. Egelhoff remained the designated beneficiary pursuant to the
Boeing plan documents, Washington State was preempted from
unsettling that designation, thereby forcing Boeing, as plan
administrator, to look outside the plan documentation to determine the
rightful recipient of Mr. Egelhoff’s insured death benefit.
By displacing the otherwise valid designation of the former Mrs.
Egelhoff, the Washington statute purports to govern “the payment of
benefits, a central matter of plan administration.”64 Thus, in Egelhoff
the Court reiterated that, as Travelers had indicated earlier, “state laws
that mandate[] employee benefit structures or their administration”65 run
afoul of Section 514(a).
Moreover, the Egelhoff Court declared, the Washington statute
“interferes with nationally uniform plan administration”66 by
prescribing a different rule for one state (divorce revokes beneficiary
designation) than prevails in other states (no such revocation on
62 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (2000)) (ERISAregulated welfare plans include “any plan, fund, or program” providing “death . . . benefits”
“through the purchase insurance or otherwise[.]”).
63 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
64 Id. at 148.
65 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 658 (1995).
66 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148.
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divorce). As national uniformity is an important objective of ERISA in
general and Section 514 in particular, the Court reasoned, this
interference further indicates that the Washington law impermissibly
“relate[s] to” an ERISA plan and, in the context of such a plan, is
preempted by Section 514(a).
Egelhoff demonstrates that, in particular cases, ERISA preemption
retains potency even under the more restrained Travelers approach to
Section 514(a) and its “relate to” clause. Indeed, Egelhoff indicates that
the Maryland Act is preempted under Travelers: If Section 514(a)
forbids Washington State from instructing an ERISA-regulated plan to
whom the plan must pay welfare benefits (or not), Maryland cannot
impose upon an ERISA-regulated plan the minimum level of welfare
benefits which the plan must pay. In both instances, the state is
“mandat[ing] employee benefit structures or their administration.” For
Maryland to force an employer to spend at least eight percent of its total
payroll on medical care is a classic instance of a state “mandat[ing an]
employee benefit structure” in violation of Section 514(a) and its rule of
preemption.
In addition, the Maryland Act, like the Washington statute,
interferes with national uniformity in plan administration by forcing an
interstate employer covered by the Act (i.e., Wal-Mart) to adopt policies
in Maryland it need not adopt in other states. This again indicates the
incompatibility between the Act and Section 514(a) as the Court has
construed that section in Travelers and Egelhoff.
Maryland’s Attorney General argues otherwise, contending that the
Act “imposes no requirements that would interfere with uniform
nationwide plan management or set up contradictory requirements
between states.”67 This contention is unpersuasive as the Act requires
Wal-Mart to do in Maryland something Wal-Mart need do in no other
state, specifically, spend a minimum percentage of its total payroll costs
on medical care. As Judge Motz correctly observed, the Maryland “Act
creates health care spending requirements that are not applicable in
most other jurisdictions.”68
Alternatively, Maryland could retort that the Act is less like the
Washington statute struck in Egelhoff and more like the New York
hospital surcharge scheme sustained in Travelers, the kind of “general
health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local
concern . . . .”69 The problem with this retort is that the Maryland Act is
not like the New York hospital surcharge scheme, a generallyapplicable regulation that impacted across-the-board upon all hospital
patients.
Rather, the Act is a narrowly-targeted regulation of
67
68
69

Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 4.
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 494 (D. Md. 2006).
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661.
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employers’ ERISA-governed medical plans—indeed, of a single
employer’s ERISA-governed medical plans.
The New York regulation sustained in Travelers levied a hospital
surcharge even if the hospitalized patient paid for his own stay or had
private insurance funding that hospital stay. The New York regulation
was thus a genuinely general medical regulation, applying broadly to all
hospitalized patients, not just to patients covered by employers’ ERISAregulated plans. The other examples of general health regulation
invoked in Travelers—hospital “[q]uality control and workplace
regulation”70—are similarly broad in their coverage and effect, applying
to all hospitals and affecting all patients, not just to those patients
participating in their employers’ ERISA-regulated health plans.
The Maryland Act, by comparison, is targeted specifically at
employer-provided medical plans, not at a broad class of health care
consumers or providers. The Maryland Act represents no mere
“indirect economic influence,” which increases costs for every
consumer of medical care including employers’ medical plans. Rather,
the evident purpose of the Act is a direct, focused financial impact on
the covered employer and its ERISA-regulated medical plan, i.e., to
force an increase in medical outlays to an eight percent minimum of
payroll.
Also instructive in this context is the Supreme Court’s postTravelers decision in Pegram v. Herdrich.71 In Pegram, the Court
observed that states’ general medical malpractice liability laws are not
ERISA-preempted when a medical mistake is made by a treating
physician working for an employer-engaged HMO. This observation is
fully consistent with the principle established in Travelers that “general
health care regulation” does not run afoul of Section 514.
Suppose, in contrast, that Maryland were to adopt a state tort
statute establishing malpractice liability only for doctors employed by
ERISA-governed plans. Such a targeted law would not be protected
from ERISA preemption as a general health regulation since it would
not be general. The same is true of the Maryland Act.
It is, in short, unpersuasive to denominate the Maryland Act as a
general health regulation when it is actually a targeted regulation of
employers’ (indeed, a single employer’s) ERISA-governed medical
plans. Even under the more restrained Travelers approach to Section
514(a), ERISA precludes states from mandating employer-provided
benefit levels in this fashion.
Finally, some supporters of the Act, including Maryland’s
Attorney General, focus upon the covered employer’s potential payment
to the Fund and, from that focus, characterize the Act as a tax law with
70
71

Id.
530 U.S. 211 (2000). For a discussion of Pegram, see Zelinsky, Pegram, supra note 58.
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only indirect impact on Wal-Mart’s ERISA-regulated medical plans.72
However, for four reasons, that characterization does not preserve the
Act from preemption under Travelers. First, as a statutory matter, state
tax laws as such are not protected from ERISA preemption. Only laws
relative to insurance, banking, and securities as well as “generally
applicable criminal law[s]” are shielded statutorily from such
preemption.73 Thus, for ERISA preemption purposes, there is no
talismanic effect from labeling a state statute as a tax law.
Second, the levy assessed by the Act, i.e., the payment to the Fund,
is not a revenue-raising measure of general applicability, but is instead a
narrowly-targeted penalty designed to force Wal-Mart to comply with
Maryland’s statutorily-imposed “benefit structure[],”74 namely, medical
outlays of at least eight percent of total payroll. It is unconvincing for
ERISA preemption purposes to characterize that penalty as a tax, given
the penalty’s narrow focus and evident purpose, namely, to coerce WalMart into increasing its health care outlays. Third, it is equally difficult
to see how the “tax” imposed by the Act can be labeled as “indirect” in
its impact upon Wal-Mart’s medical plans for its employees. Rather,
that “tax” is specifically aimed at such plans and the level of health care
coverage they provide.
Finally, under Travelers, even a law with “indirect” effect may
have sufficiently harsh impact to be ERISA-preempted. In this
connection, the Travelers Court specifically observed “that a state law
might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or
otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
substantive coverage . . . .”75 “[S]uch a state law,” the Court noted,
“might indeed be pre-empted under Section 514.”76 Even if the Act is
properly characterized as a tax with only indirect effects on ERISA
plans (a characterization of which I am skeptical), the economic effect
of the Act and of the tax it imposes is indeed acute. The tax forces WalMart to embrace Maryland’s substantive standard for health care
coverage, i.e., a minimum outlay of eight percent of total payroll.

72 Hakim et al., supra note 15 (quoting Jennifer Sung that New York’s proposed version of
the Maryland Act “requires employers to pay a tax to the state or they can pay less tax to the state
if they spend a certain amount on employee health care. It doesn’t have any direct relation to
ERISA . . . .”); see also Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 3 (characterizing the Act as
“a revenue raising measure rather than a regulation of employers”); Karen Setze, Is Maryland’s
‘Wal-Mart Bill’ A Tax?, Apr. 5, 2006, ST. TAX TODAY, at 65-11 (quoting attorney Marc I.
Machiz that the Act establishes “a tax on employers—admittedly a very limited tax—to fund
uninsured health care through the Medicaid program . . . .”).
73 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §§ 514(b)(2)(A), 514(b)(4),
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000)).
74 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658.
75 Id. at 668.
76 Id.
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Consider in this context the marginal rate of the “tax” imposed by
the Act: 100 percent. For each dollar that Wal-Mart’s medical outlays
fall below the minimum threshold of eight percent of payroll, Wal-Mart
must pay a dollar to the Fund. This dollar-for-dollar scheme is
evidently designed to coerce Wal-Mart into raising its medical
expenditures for its Maryland employees until Wal-Mart attains the
statutory threshold. Even under the more restrained approach of
Travelers, the Act, by virtue of its coercive nature, is ERISApreempted, even if the Act is denominated as an indirect tax law.
In the context of the claim that the Act establishes an indirect tax
that survives ERISA preemption, the Court’s post-Travelers decision in
De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund77 is
instructive. In De Buono, a self-insured ERISA welfare plan “own[ed]
and operate[d] three medical centers . . . that provide[d] medical, dental
and other health care benefits.”78 The plan challenged on ERISA
preemption grounds a New York tax imposed “on gross receipts for
patient services at hospitals, residential health care facilities, and
diagnostic and treatment centers.”79
Critical to the De Buono Court’s rejection of this preemption
challenge was the “general applicability”80 of the challenged tax: the tax
applied to all New York medical facilities, not just to those facilities
operated by ERISA plans. Moreover, the tax statute questioned in De
Buono did not “contain . . . provisions that expressly refer to . . . ERISA
plans.”81
In contrast, the Act, assuming it is a tax law, is a different kind of
tax law. The Act only applies with reference to the covered employer’s
ERISA plans for employee health care and is only triggered by the
employer’s failure to contribute to such plans the statutory minimum of
payroll decreed by the Act. Consequently, the Act is not a tax law of
“general applicability,” raising funds neutrally from a broad swath of
health care providers. Rather, the Act is a targeted penalty statute that
only assesses liability with reference to an employer’s contributions to
its ERISA-regulated medical plans for its employees. And, in the final
analysis, the Act and its dollar-for-dollar tax are designed to force WalMart to adopt Maryland’s “scheme of substantive coverage,”82
specifically, a minimum health care outlay of eight percent of total
payroll.

77
78
79
80
81
82

520 U.S. 806 (1997).
Id. at 810.
Id. at 809-10.
Id. at 815.
Id.
N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 668 (1995).
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In short, even under the more relaxed preemption standards
announced in Travelers,83 the Act, even if denominated a tax law with
only indirect effect, unacceptably coerces the covered employer as to
the substance of the employer’s welfare plans’ coverage.84
In summary, under the more restrained interpretation of Section
514(a) announced in Travelers and its progeny including Egelhoff,
ERISA preempts the Maryland Act since the Act both mandates the
level of Wal-Mart’s medical outlays and impairs national uniformity in
the administration of Wal-Mart’s medical plans. The impact of the Act
on Wal-Mart’s medical plans is direct and acute.
Judge Motz was understandably reluctant to discern a sharp break
between the Supreme Court’s pre- and post-Travelers cases when the
Court itself has been reluctant to acknowledge such a break.85
Nevertheless, Judge Motz’s reading of Travelers and its progeny is the
same as that advanced by myself and others who do see a significant
difference between the Shaw and the Travelers approaches to ERISA
preemption. Even under the more relaxed Travelers standard, ERISA
preempts any state law “mandating that an employer provide a certain
type or monetary level of welfare benefits in an ERISA plan.”86 And
this, Judge Motz correctly observed, is exactly what the Maryland Act
does:
The Act is not merely tangentially related to ERISA plans but is
focused upon them. Indeed, as the legislative history makes clear,
the Fair Share Act is targeted directly at the ERISA plan of a
particular employer. Moreover, the economic effect of the Fair
Share Act upon Wal-Mart’s ERISA plan could not be more direct: it
would require Wal-Mart to increase its health care benefits for
Maryland employees and to administer its plan in such a fashion as
to ensure that the statutory spending required by the Act is met.87

83 A similar conclusion emerges under the Shaw approach to ERISA preemption. Even if the
Maryland Act is viewed as a tax law with only indirect impact, the tax imposed, i.e., the required
payment to the Fund, is the difference between the covered employer’s statutorily-required
outlays for health care and its actual outlays. Thus, labeling the Act (or any similar law) as a tax
law with indirect impact does not avoid the central issue under Shaw: The Act and the tax it
imposes both refer to and are connected with the covered employer’s payments (or lack thereof)
to the employer’s ERISA-regulated welfare plan for employees’ medical coverage. Under Shaw,
such reference and connection result in preemption of the Act per Section 514.
84 Judge Motz’s analysis of the Act is similar: “[T]he intended effect of the Act is to force
Wal-Mart to increase its contribution to its health benefit plan, which is an ERISA plan, and the
actual effect of the Act will be to coerce Wal-Mart into doing so.” Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v.
Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 495 (D. Md. 2006).
85 Id. at 495 (“[T]his court has no authority to disregard Supreme Court precedent on the
basis of the prediction that the Court would overrule its decisions.”).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 496.
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Reasoned Textualism

Travelers and its progeny represent an important effort by the
Court to reform the overly-expansive Shaw-based approach to ERISA
preemption, albeit a reform effort the Court itself has so far declined to
acknowledge fully. Nevertheless, Travelers, while preferable to the
capacious Shaw-based approach to Section 514, is itself not a persuasive
construction of that provision. A better approach to Section 514 can be
denoted “reasoned textualism,”88 the effort to make the statute workable
while engaging the statutory text respectfully. A reasoned textualist
understanding of Section 514(a) again points to preemption of the
Maryland Act since the Act intrudes upon employers’ autonomy as to
medical plan participation and funding, topics ERISA reserves for
employer discretion.
Fundamental to the interpretation of ERISA Section 514(a) is
ERISA Section 514(b), which exempts from Section 514(a) states’
insurance, banking, and securities laws,89 as well as “generally
applicable criminal law[s].”90 These exemptions belie the postTravelers notion, advanced by Justices Scalia,91 Ginsburg,92 Breyer,93
and Stevens,94 that Section 514(a) merely codifies traditional
preemption doctrine, which is quite solicitous of state law. If that is so,
from what are these exempted state laws exempt?95 And why would
Congress have enacted a provision—ERISA Section 514(a)—which
redundantly pronounced preemption doctrine that the Court would have
applied anyway?
More plausibly, the exemptions of Section 514(b) are read as
furnishing relief from the tougher preemption scrutiny otherwise
imposed by Section 514(a).96
88
89

Zelinsky, supra note 21.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 514(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. No.
93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000)).
90 ERISA § 514(b)(4).
91 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 36566 (1997); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001).
92 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 356-66; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152.
93 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 153-61.
94 Id.
95 Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 832.
96 Of similar import to the construction of Section 514 is what has come to be known as “the
deemer clause,” ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B). This provision precludes states from deeming ERISA
plans to be insurance companies. The evident purpose of this provision is to limit the insurance
exemption of Section 514(b) to “true” insurance companies, thereby preventing states from
intruding their insurance laws too far at the expense of ERISA. Again, this indicates that there is
something from which Section 514(b) exempts state insurance laws, i.e., more searching
preemption scrutiny under Section 514(a). The deemer clause cabins the insurance exemption.
Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 813. The deemer clause proves important when analyzing the
Maryland Act as a purported regulation of insurance. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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For those who believe in legislative history, the congressional
hoopla surrounding the adoption of Section 514(a) is equally hard to
reconcile with the view that that section embodies nothing more than
normal preemption doctrine. In the House of Representatives, a leading
sponsor of ERISA, Congressman John Dent, effusively declared that
Section 514 “is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation.”97
It is difficult to understand that encomium if Section 514(a) is nothing
more than a redundant statement of preemption doctrine the Court
would apply anyway.
Consequently, the critical task in the construction of Section 514(a)
is to give content to the higher than usual level of preemption scrutiny
mandated by Section 514(a) without succumbing to the potential
indeterminacy of the phrase “relate to.” In simplest terms, the task is to
find a middle way under which Section 514(a) is neither limitless (as it
is under Shaw) nor redundant (as it is under the four justices’
conception of Travelers). The best resolution of this task is to interpret
Section 514(a) as reversing the traditional presumption against
preemption by establishing a statutory presumption for such
preemption. Without surrendering to the potential indeterminacy of the
“relate to” clause, this approach gives content to Section 514(a),
mandating in the ERISA context a more searching preemption inquiry
than normal. This approach also preserves the structure of ERISA,
providing that there is something—the presumption for preemption
established in Section 514(a)—from which state banking, insurance,
securities, and criminal laws are exempted by Section 514(b).
The second component of the reasoned textualist approach to
Section 514(a) stems from the much-discussed disparity in the structure
of ERISA vis-a-vis pension and welfare plans. As has been frequently
noted,98 ERISA, while it governs both pension and welfare plans,
governs them quite differently. ERISA’s provisions pertaining to
disclosure and reporting,99 fiduciary responsibility,100 and
administration and enforcement101 apply to pension102 and welfare plans
97 JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A
POLITICAL HISTORY 268 (2004).
98 LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND
WELFARE BENEFITS 91-92 (2004) (discussing “ERISA’s lack of substantive regulation” of
welfare plans); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
176-78 (3d ed. 2000) (“The result of this statutory latticework is that only three parts of ERISA’s
Title I do apply to welfare benefit plans . . . .”); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by
“Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens and Great-West, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1323-24 (2003) (noting that “ERISA excused” welfare plans from such
“substantive rules” as “vesting, anti-reduction, and funding rules” which apply to pension plans).
99 ERISA §§ 101-111.
100 Id. §§ 401-414.
101 Id. §§ 501-514.
102 ERISA’s definition of pensions includes profit sharing plans such as Section 401(k)
arrangements. See id. § 3(2)(B) (providing that any plan which “results in a deferral of income”
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alike. However, for pensions, ERISA provides elaborate rules as to
funding103 and as to participation and vesting.104 In contrast, ERISA is
silent on these subjects relative to welfare plans. Under the normal
precepts of preemption, the presence in ERISA of such substantive
regulation for pensions but not for welfare plans suggests greater scope
for state regulation of such welfare plans since there is no federal
regulation occupying the field.
However, a better reading of the statute105 infers from Section 514
and the structure of ERISA a zone of employer autonomy in the design
and operation of employers’ welfare plans. As to the topics falling
inside this zone, employers, while constrained vis-a-vis pension plans,
can determine the content of their welfare plans free of regulation.
Under this approach, when a state law impacting employers’ welfare
plans is challenged as ERISA-preempted, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the state law intrudes upon a subject on which ERISA
affirmatively regulates pensions. If so, there is a presumption that the
challenged state law is preempted as intruding upon the employer’s
discretionary zone of welfare plan autonomy. Thus, the scope of
ERISA’s pension regulation determines the zone of autonomy for
welfare plans.
For present purposes, my goal is not to persuade the reader that the
reasoned textualist perspective on Section 514(a) is correct,106 but to
observe that under this approach also, as under the Shaw and Travelers
approaches, Section 514(a) preempts the Maryland Act. The Act, by
mandating a minimum health care outlay of eight percent of total
payroll, pressures Wal-Mart to extend employer-provided health care
participation to more of Wal-Mart’s employees.107 This attempt to
expand employee participation in employer-sponsored medical care
intrudes upon an area where, as a textual matter, ERISA creates a zone

is a pension plan for ERISA purposes).
103 Id. §§ 301-306.
104 Id. §§ 201-211.
105 See Zelinsky, supra note 21, at 839-41.
106 Though I believe it is. See id.; Zelinsky, supra note 60.
107 Wal-Mart might respond to the Act in other ways. For example, Wal-Mart might decrease
its Maryland payroll or employment (or both) or might increase its medical coverage for existing
(or fewer) participants. Any of these approaches (or some combination of them) could place
Wal-Mart outside the coverage of the Act (since Wal-Mart’s Maryland employment would drop
below the 10,000 statutory threshold) or could bring Wal-Mart into compliance with the Act (by
bringing Wal-Mart’s medical outlays to eight percent of payroll). Those possibilities, which
suggest that the Act is poorly designed, do not alter the basic observation in the text, that the Act
pressures Wal-Mart to increase medical plan participation, even though Wal-Mart might respond
to that pressure in other ways. For a discussion of the possibility that Wal-Mart could respond to
the Act by decreasing Maryland employment and medical coverage, see discussion infra Part
IV.B.
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of employer autonomy since ERISA mandates minimum participation
rules for pensions108 but not for welfare arrangements.
Similarly, the Maryland Act pressures the covered employer to
increase its funding for employees’ medical care or to persist in funding
above the statutory requirement. Funding too is an area where ERISA
creates for employers a zone of welfare plan autonomy since ERISA
regulates pension funding,109 but not the financing of welfare plans.
Maryland cannot overcome the presumption that its Act is preempted
since the Act intrudes upon two topics—participation and funding—
where ERISA, as a textual matter, provides detailed regulation of
pensions but is best construed as reserving for employers a zone of
welfare plan discretion.
Instructive in this context is Judge Motz’s observation that “no
rational employer would choose to pay”110 to Maryland’s Fair Share
Health Care Fund. Rather, confronted with the “Hobson’s choice”111
created by the Act, Wal-Mart is forced by the Act to “increas[e] its
employees’ benefits,”112 i.e., to increase the participation in and/or the
funding of Wal-Mart’s medical care plans.
In short, a reasoned textualist approach to Section 514(a) and
ERISA preemption leads to the conclusion that the Maryland Act is
incompatible with the ERISA-created zone of welfare plan autonomy.
The Act intrudes upon employers’ decisions as to participation in, and
the funding of, their medical arrangements for their employees. ERISA
is best understood as creating a presumption for preemption, a
presumption confirmed by the Maryland Act’s impact upon areas—
welfare plan participation and funding—which ERISA reserves for
employer discretion.
D.

The Insurance Exemption

As previously observed,113 the Act’s definition of “health insurance
costs” is inelegant. Included within that definition are covered
employers’ self-funded health care outlays from the employers’ own
resources. It is possible that the drafters of the Act used the term
“insurance costs” inadvisably or colloquially when what they really
meant instead was the totality of the covered employers’ medicalrelated expenses.
108
109
110
111
112
113

See ERISA § 202. A parallel statutory provision is I.R.C. § 410(a).
See ERISA §§ 301-308, 1081-1086. A parallel statutory provision is I.R.C. § 412.
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 495 (D. Md. 2006).
Id. at 497.
Id.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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It is, however, also possible that something subtler is involved in
the Act’s use of the imprecise label “health insurance costs” to describe
the entirety of employers’ medical expenditures including expenditures
pursuant to self-funded plans. The drafters of the Act, by characterizing
the subject of the Act as medical insurance, may have sought for the Act
the protection of ERISA Section 514(b)(2)(A) and its exemption for
state insurance laws. If so, the drafters missed their mark. Despite the
Act’s labeling of employers’ medical expenses as “health insurance
costs,” the Act, by virtue of ERISA’s “deemer clause,”114 does not
“regulate[] insurance” within the meaning of Section 514(b)(2)(A) since
the Act covers employers’ ERISA-governed, self-funded plans, i.e.,
arrangements under which Wal-Mart pays all medical outlays from its
own resources without purchasing medical insurance coverage from an
insurance company. Consequently, the Maryland Act is overly-broad
and does not fall within the insurance exemption from Section 514(a).
The deemer clause provides that no ERISA-governed plan may be
“deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be
engaged in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate” insurance entities.115 As the Supreme
Court observed in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, because of the deemer
clause:
Self-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as
that regulation “relate[s] to” the plans. State laws directed toward
the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit
plan but are not “saved” because they do not regulate insurance.
State laws that directly regulate insurance are “saved” but do not
reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans may not
be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in
the business of insurance for purposes of such state laws. 116

The Maryland Act does precisely what the deemer clause forbids:
regulate a covered employer’s self-funded medical plan under the guise
of insurance regulation. Specifically, the Act counts employers’ selffunded health outlays toward the required eight percent minimum of
payroll and mandates a payment to the Fund if those self-financed
outlays fail the statutory minimum.
Recall in this context the Act’s definitions of “health insurance
costs.”117 These definitions are not limited to health insurance
premiums. Rather, the definitions count against the eight percent

114 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B). For background on the deemer clause, see FROLIK & MOORE,
supra note 98, at 242; LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 98, at 548; WOOTEN, supra note 97, at
236, 258-59, 281-82.
115 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B).
116 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
117 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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minimum118 any “health care” outlay that is deductible by the employer
for federal income tax purposes as well as any employer “payments” for
any “health benefits” as defined in Section 213(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code. None of these qualifying outlays need be for insurance
or otherwise have anything to do with insurers or insurance.
Thus, if Wal-Mart eschews all forms of medical insurance and
pays all of its employees’ medical expenses from Wal-Mart’s general
assets, the Act may deem Wal-Mart’s self-funded plans inadequate and
consequently impose upon Wal-Mart a liability equal to the difference
between the eight percent statutory minimum and the amount of WalMart’s payments to Wal-Mart’s self-funded medical plans. Under the
structure of ERISA Section 514, the Maryland Act could apply to selffunded plans in this fashion only if such plans are deemed to be in the
business of insurance, a result the deemer clause forbids.
Confirming this conclusion is Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans,
Inc. v. Miller119 in which the Supreme Court rejected an ERISA
preemption challenge to Kentucky’s “any willing provider” statute.
Kentucky’s statute, like similar laws in other states, requires every
Kentucky HMO and every non-ERISA medical plan120 to reimburse for
the medical services furnished by any doctor or other medical provider
who agrees to accept the HMO’s or plan’s published fee schedule. The
Kentucky statute does not apply to any self-funded, ERISA-governed
plan.
In the face of an ERISA preemption challenge, the Court
unanimously upheld the Kentucky “any willing provider” law as a
regulation of insurance, protected from preemption by the insurance
exemption of Section 514(b). Important for the Maryland Act is the fact
that the Kentucky statute does not apply to self-funded plans regulated
by ERISA.121 By limiting itself to true insurance entities such as HMOs
and to plans outside the scope of ERISA coverage, the Kentucky statute
survived ERISA preemption as a bona fide regulation of insurance.
Thus, Kentucky did what Maryland did not:122 enact a true
insurance statute that keeps its distance from employers’ self-funded,
ERISA-regulated medical plans. By virtue of the deemer clause, only a
law which, in this fashion, eschews regulation of employers’ selffunded plans is a protected insurance law under Section 514(b)(2)(A).

118
119
120

Six percent for nonprofit employers.
538 U.S. 329 (2003); see Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58, at 1-9.
For these purposes, the most important plans not regulated by ERISA are church and
government plans. See ERISA §§ 4(b)(1), (2).
121 Kentucky Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1.
122 A variant of this observation is that Hawaii did what Maryland did not: obtain an
amendment to Section 514 to remove from the scope of ERISA preemption a state statute that
would otherwise be ERISA-preempted. See ERISA § 514(b)(5).
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In contrast, the Act regulates Wal-Mart’s self-funded plans by requiring
that they satisfy the eight percent of payroll test.
In sum, if the Act’s inelegant reference to “health insurance costs”
is a deliberate effort to claim the insurance-related protection from
preemption afforded by Section 514(b)(2)(A), that effort fails because
of the deemer clause and the Act’s regulation of covered employers’
self-funded medical outlays, regulation the deemer clause forbids.
E.

Summary

As a matter of positive law, the Act is preempted by virtue of
ERISA Section 514(a).123 Under the original, capacious construction of
Section 514(a) initially embraced by the Court in Shaw and in Shaw’s
progeny including Greater Washington Board of Trade, the Maryland
Act “relate[s] to” covered employers’ ERISA-regulated health plans by
referring to the outlays of such plans and by having a connection with
such plans. Under the more restricted construction of Section 514(a)
advanced in Travelers and its offspring including Egelhoff, the
Maryland Act is similarly ERISA-preempted by virtue of the Act’s
effort to mandate the level of covered employers’ medical outlays and
the Act’s impairment of nationally uniform welfare plan administration.
If Section 514(a) is interpreted through the reasoned textualist
approach I favor, the Act is, again, preempted as a regulation of the
participation in and the funding of covered employers’ welfare plans.
From the reasoned textualist vantage, Section 514(a) creates a
presumption that the Act is ERISA-preempted insofar as the Act affects
such welfare plans. That presumption is confirmed by the Act’s
intrusion upon the covered employers’ zone of welfare plan autonomy,
a zone within which employers have discretion to determine who
participates in their medical coverage and how that coverage is funded.
By virtue of ERISA’s deemer clause, the Act is not saved from
ERISA preemption as a regulation of insurance since the Act regulates
covered employers’ self-funded medical outlays, declaring such outlays
inadequate if they are less than eight percent of Wal-Mart’s Maryland
payroll. The deemer clause forbids such regulation.

123 Quite independently of the legal controversy surrounding ERISA Section 514(a), another
preemption debate swirls around ERISA Section 502. The Supreme Court has construed Section
502 as severely limiting the remedies available to injured ERISA plaintiffs. While the debate
about the Supreme Court’s preemption approach to ERISA Section 502 is important, it has no
direct relevance for the Maryland Act.
For commentary on the ERISA Section 502 preemption controversy, see LANGBEIN, supra
note 98, at 770; Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58; Korobkin, supra note 52.
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For all these reasons, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland decided correctly when it held the Maryland Wal-Mart Act to
be ERISA-preempted. The Fourth Circuit should affirm that decision.
III. SHOULD ERISA PREEMPT THE ACT?
The conclusion that, as a matter of positive law, ERISA preempts
the Maryland Act leads to the normative question: Should ERISA
preempt the Act? I answer this inquiry in the negative. As a normative
matter, ERISA should not preempt the Maryland Act or any similar
state statute regulating employers’ medical plans. I explain below my
misgivings about the Maryland Act as a matter of policy.124 However,
as problematic as the Act is in terms of policy, Maryland (or any other
state) should be free to experiment with its own approach to employerprovided health care.
It is a truism of contemporary federalism that the states should
serve as laboratories of experimentation.125 ERISA’s preemption of
state law stops that experimentation by invalidating laws like the Act.
Health care is today among the nation’s most urgent domestic concerns.
To date, no one has convinced the American public that he has found
the ultimate solution to the problems of controlling health care costs and
of assuring access to such care. Under the circumstances, medical care
is the kind of topic where state-by-state experimentation is appropriate
to determine what works and what does not. Experimentation includes
an acceptance of experiments that one considers inadvisable, as I think
the Maryland Act is.
The countervailing policy, stressed by the Egelhoff Court, is the
perceived need for national uniformity in the administration of welfare
plans. For two reasons, I am, as a normative matter, not persuaded of
the need for national standards that preclude experiments like the
Maryland Act. First, in other areas, corporations operating across state
lines adjust to different states’ varied laws, e.g., local land use
ordinances, individual states’ workers’ compensation systems. There is
no important distinction between these diverse laws, with which
interstate corporations successfully cope, and a similarly pluralistic
regime under which each state would formulate its own rules for health
care. Given the ability of interstate businesses to adapt to varied state
laws in other contexts, it is difficult to see an insurmountable problem if
124
125

See discussion infra Part IV.
This celebrated metaphor comes from Justice Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). For further elaboration of the value of state-by-state
experimentation as to the regulation of medical care, see Zelinsky, Against, supra note 58;
Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58.
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interstate corporations must similarly adapt to different state laws on
medical coverage.
Indeed, interstate corporations that insure (rather than self-fund)
their employees’ medical coverage already accommodate different state
law regimes. Such corporations routinely purchase policies which vary
from state to state in light of each state’s idiosyncratic regulation of its
own insurance industry and its products. To illustrate these state-bystate variations among medical insurance policies, Cogan, Hubbard, and
Kessler observe that
California requires insurance plans to cover both contraceptives and
in-vitro fertilization; Virginia requires coverage of contraceptives but
not in-vitro fertilization; and Florida, Indiana, and Pennsylvania
require coverage of neither service.126

These kinds of state-by-state variations in insurance coverage have
caused no perceptible problems for interstate corporations purchasing
insurance for their employees. Interstate corporations could similarly
adapt their non-insured, self-funded medical plans to different states’
respective regulations of those plans.
Such state-by-state adaptation will impose some costs on interstate
corporations, both procedurally (e.g., legal fees to comply with each
state’s own regulatory scheme) and substantively (e.g., greater
payments to covered employees in states which mandate more
coverage). However, if any particular corporation finds prohibitive the
medical costs of operating in any state, that corporation has the same
options for medical costs as the corporation does with respect to any
other state-imposed costs, namely, to shift its operations elsewhere or to
lobby for different state laws. There is no need for a single, federallyimposed standard.
Second, concern about national uniformity as to welfare plans
largely stems from a false analogy to pensions. In light of employee
mobility across state lines and the cumulative nature of pension
entitlements, there is a strong conflict-of-laws argument for nationally
uniform pension laws. Different state rules for pensions would
engender confusion and complexity as employees relocate across state
lines, bringing with them pension entitlements earned elsewhere. There
is, however, no equivalent mobility-related problem for medical
arrangements since, at any moment, an employee is covered by only one
discrete set of medical benefits. When the employee moves to another
state, he does not take cumulative medical rights with him and thus does

126 JOHN F. COGAN, R. GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY, WEALTHY AND
WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 44 (2005). Cogan, Hubbard and Kessler
take a dim view of these state-imposed requirements for medical insurance, arguing that they
unacceptably increase the cost of such insurance.
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not encounter any pension-type conflict-of-law problem as to his
medical coverage.
To illustrate this difference between cumulative pension and
discrete medical rights, consider a theoretical world in which every state
can promulgate its own vesting rules for pensions. Suppose, for
example, that in State A an employee has an immediately nonforfeitable
right to any pension benefit he has earned, that the law of State B vests
an employee in his accrued pension rights only after fifteen years of
service with the sponsoring employer, and that State C’s rule is a
particular form of graduated vesting, five percent additional vesting for
each year of service, ending in full vesting at year twenty. Assume
further that, over the course of a decade, an employee works for an
employer in State A, then in State B and, finally, in State C, accruing
cumulative pension benefits in all three states.127
Which vesting schedule or schedules apply to this employee and
his cumulative pension benefit? State A’s immediate schedule on the
theory that State A is where his career began? State C’s graduated
vesting schedule on the theory that that is where the employee is now?
When the employee moves from State A (where he was fully vested) to
State B (where he is not vested at all), should this movement to State B
unsettle the vesting the employee had previously earned in State A?
Perhaps each state’s vesting rule should apply to the portion of the
pension benefit earned in that particular state. This is a theoretically
tidy solution that will prove messy in practice for employees who are
highly mobile during their careers and thus must keep track of the
different pension rules controlling in the different states in which they
have worked.
In the face of these quandaries, a national approach to pension
vesting is sensible since the employee can move from state-to-state
without his pension rights being impaired or becoming unnecessarily
complicated by conflicting state laws.
A similar story can be told as to pension participation. Suppose a
world in which State A requires immediate pension participation for all
employees, State B delays mandatory pension participation until the
employee’s completion of the tenth year of service with the employer,
and State C requires the employee’s inclusion in the employer’s pension
plan only upon his fifth year of employment. What happens in this
world as the employee moves from A to B to C? Does he stay in the
pension while living in B and C on the theory that his right of
immediate participation from State A carries over to other jurisdictions?
127 This example could be complicated further by having the employee reside in State D when
he works in State A, in State E when he works in State B and in State F when he works in State C.
As the state of residence, D, E and F might also assert the primacy of its respective vesting
schedule.
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Or does the employee drop from the plan as he moves from State A to
State B with its tougher participation requirement? Again, federal
legislation, providing nationally uniform participation rules, is a
compelling solution to these conflict-of-law quandaries.
In contrast, medical coverage does not involve a cumulative right
that grows over time in different states. Rather, the employee is, at any
one time, a resident of only one state. Consequently none of the
conflict-of-law issues that arise for pensions arise for medical care.
Assume now a world in which the states can regulate all employerprovided medical coverage including employers’ self-funded plans. In
this hypothetical world, when an employee lives in State A, he is
covered by whatever rules prevail there. When he moves to State B, his
medical care entitlement may change under the laws of his new state,
but there is no implication for the coverage he previously enjoyed in
State A (it is over) or for the coverage he will subsequently enjoy in
State C (it has not yet begun). Indeed, in the world as it exists today, if
an employer purchases different medical insurance policies in States A,
B, and C, this mobile employee may already receive different health
care coverage as he moves from state to state.
In particular cases, those differences might be harmful to the
employee, if, for example, the new state does not require a treatment the
employee was receiving in his old state. Alternatively, state-by-state
differentials might help the employee, if, for example, the new state
requires coverage that the old state does not. In the former case, the
employee might demand as a precondition of the transfer that the
employer continue to pay for medical costs that were insured before the
transfer. Or an interstate employer might, on its own, provide selfinsured benefits in excess of the mandated state minima for insurance.
In any case, there is no conflict-of-law argument for federal
regulation of medical care as there is for pensions. The entitlement to
medical care is discrete, not cumulative. In the medical care context,
movement to a new state with a different legal regime poses no difficult
conflict-of-law problems, as it would for state-regulated pensions.
There is, consequently, no compelling argument for national regulation
of medical plans, as there is for pension plans.
I have previously urged abolition of Section 514(a) on federalism
grounds.128 The Maryland Act reinforces the argument for such
abolition of ERISA preemption. As a normative matter, Maryland
should be free to experiment as to health care regulation—though, under
Section 514(a), it cannot.

128

See Zelinsky, Against, supra note 58; Zelinksy, Sequel, supra note 58.
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IV. IS THE ACT SOUND POLICY?
This brings us to the final inquiry: Does the Maryland Wal-Mart
Act, independent of its status under ERISA, represent sound policy?
My conclusion is negative. While, as a matter of federalism, Maryland
should be free to adopt the Act in the interests of experimentation, on
the merits, the Act is an ill-conceived experiment. For the short-run, the
Act hurts Wal-Mart’s predominantly low-income customers by raising
Wal-Mart’s prices. For the long-run, the Act hurts those customers as
well as workers, who forfeit employment with Wal-Mart as a result of
the costs the Act imposes on Wal-Mart. In contrast to the Act, there are
carefully-crafted means by which Maryland (and other states) can assist
low-income workers, including the establishment and expansion of state
earned income tax credits. The Act is designed not to mandate a broad
expansion of employment-based medical coverage, but, rather, to make
a largely symbolic attack on Wal-Mart.
A.

The Act’s Short-Run Effects on Consumer Prices

To gauge the initial economic impact of the Act, let us start with
the assumption that, for the short-run, Wal-Mart’s demand for labor is
inelastic, that is to say, price-insensitive. As a first cut, this assumption
is credible since the substitution of capital for higher-priced labor does
not occur instantaneously. Thus, Wal-Mart (or any other covered
employer), for the short-run, will respond to the Act by retaining all of
its Maryland employees, though it is more expensive than before to do
so.
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The vertical curve DL in Figure 1 reflects this assumption about
Wal-Mart’s demand for labor, i.e., that the Act and the costs it imposes
on Wal-Mart will not initially depress the number of Wal-Mart
employees in Maryland. S is the labor supply curve Wal-Mart
confronted before the adoption of the Act. S1 is S shifted to the left to
reflect the extra health care costs imposed upon Wal-Mart by the Act.
S1 is the labor supply curve Wal-Mart confronts under the Act.
P1 is the wage Wal-Mart paid prior to adoption of the Act. WalMart’s total labor costs (including the cost of whatever medical care
Wal-Mart furnished to employees before adoption of the Act) are
represented by the rectangle (P1, X, Q1, O). The rectangle (P2, Y, X, P1)
represents the extra health care costs Wal-Mart will pay in the short-run
to comply with the Act.
Figure 1 captures the benign scenario promised by supporters of
the Act. No one loses his job because of the costs the Act imposes on
Wal-Mart. As a result of the Act, Wal-Mart finances health care for
previously uncovered employees or increases its medical outlays for its
already covered employees or does some of both. Given the assumption
of short-run inelasticity in the demand for labor, it is plausible to
conclude that, as an initial matter, the Act causes a certain number of
Wal-Mart employees to obtain employer-provided medical coverage
with no job loss to the Wal-Mart workforce.
It is, however, implausible to conclude that the Act’s short-run
consequences end at this happy point. The Act increases Wal-Mart’s
cost of doing business in Maryland by the amount (P2, Y, X, P1). WalMart will shift these increased costs to Wal-Mart’s customers.
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Figure 2 represents Wal-Mart’s relationship with its customers,
before and after the adoption of the Maryland Act. Prior to the adoption
of the Act, Wal-Mart sold to its customers at prices (P1) based on the
costs reflected in initial supply curve S and the demand of Wal-Mart
customers as represented by DC. The Act increases Wal-Mart’s costs,
resulting in S1 and higher prices (P2) for Wal-Mart consumers. Faced
with these higher prices, the quantity of Wal-Mart goods demanded by
Wal-Mart customers decreases from Q1 to Q2. The goods these
consumers still buy from Wal-Mart are now higher priced (P2 rather
than P1) because those prices embody the costs of the health care
expenses mandated by the Act. The triangle ABC represents the wellknown consumer dead-weight loss,129 i.e., the loss in consumer welfare
to Wal-Mart shoppers who, responding to higher prices, transfer their
purchases from the now more expensive Wal-Mart goods they
previously bought to other less desirable goods.130
Thus, the short-run welfare gain to Wal-Mart employees (more
medical coverage) is counterbalanced by the economic cost to Wal-Mart
customers (higher prices at Wal-Mart, dead-weight loss from the priceinduced shift to other merchants).

129 See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 292 (5th ed.
2001).
130 If these alternative non-Wal-Mart goods had been more desirable, consumers would have
purchased these goods before the Act increased Wal-Mart’s costs and prices.

2006]

MARYLAND’S “WAL-MART” ACT

881

In public choice terms,131 the Act presents a politically compelling
trade-off for Maryland’s legislators since the Wal-Mart workers
acquiring health care coverage are a concentrated group of Maryland
voters for whom the advantage of the Act will be apparent in the form
of their new coverage. In contrast, the costs of the Act will be spread
among a diffuse group (Wal-Mart customers) and will largely be hidden
from the members of that group since those costs will be embedded in
the prices charged by Wal-Mart.132 From a public choice perspective,
the adoption of the Act reflects a straightforward political calculus. By
enacting the Act, Maryland’s legislators bestowed visible largesse upon
an identifiable group of voters while imposing the costs of that largesse
on disorganized persons who will largely be unaware of those costs.
Indeed, in public choice terms, the Act is particularly attractive to
Maryland legislators since at least some, perhaps most, of the Wal-Mart
customers who will pay for the costs of the Act are not Maryland
residents. Wal-Mart (like any other corporation likely to trigger the
coverage of the Act) is an integrated, national firm. Hence, the costs of
the Act will likely be shifted, not just to Wal-Mart customers in
Maryland, but to Wal-Mart customers throughout the nation, perhaps
even internationally.133
While some of these Wal-Mart customers may be affluent, the
typical Wal-Mart consumer in the United States is not.134 The
131 Public choice theory conceives of elected officials as self-maximizing political
entrepreneurs who, to maintain power, bestow visible largesse on well-organized interest groups
while diffusing the costs of that largesse among the disorganized and the unknowing. See
Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense
of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 (1993); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public
Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1369 (1993).
132 Wal-Mart could try to disclose costs on price tags or in other forms of in-store publicity. I
am skeptical of the efficacy of such efforts.
133 Some might be tempted to use this analysis to bolster the normative case for ERISA
preemption: Maryland (or any other state) can export the cost of medical care for its residents to
Wal-Mart’s customers in other states, indeed, maybe to Wal-Mart’s customers abroad. These
externally imposed costs argue for federal, rather than, state regulation.
The problem with this argument is that it proves too much. All state tax and regulatory
policies affect national corporations and, as a matter of economics, are exported to out-of-state
customers. If, for example, Maryland increases real property taxes to improve public schools,
that cost too would be reflected in Wal-Mart’s prices for its non-Maryland customers. I see no
reason to distinguish state policies vis-a-vis medical care from these other state tax and regulatory
programs. Unless we are prepared to preempt all because they can be exported, I do not see why
we should preempt some.
134 Wal-Mart President Lee Scott recently supported an increase in the minimum wage.
According to a Wal-Mart spokesman, Wal-Mart favors a minimum wage increase because of its
“beneficial effect on our customers.” Jon Gertner, What Is a Living Wage?, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 15,
2006, § 6 (Magazine),at 43 .
One student of Wal-Mart characterizes Wal-Mart as having a “fixation on low-income
consumers.” He similarly defines Wal-Mart’s core customers as “working-class ‘loyalists.’”
ANTHONY BIANCO, THE BULLY OF BENTONVILLE 271, 288 (2006).
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advocates of “living wage” proposals to increase the minimum wage
often appeal to the image of the low-paid waiter working in a highpriced restaurant, imagery which many (myself included) find quite
powerful: Wealthy and middle class restaurant customers can afford to
pay a little more to help those less fortunate.135 However, for the Act, a
quite different picture emerges. At least some (perhaps many) WalMart customers earn less than Wal-Mart’s rank-and-file employees—
and, for the short run, those customers will, via higher prices, finance
the health care benefits provided to those employees under the Act.
Moreover, in public choice terms, there is a second, perhaps even
more important, constituency benefiting from the Act—Maryland’s
unions.
Via the Act, Maryland’s unions protect the higher
compensation standards those unions have obtained from Wal-Mart’s
competitors. The Act, by forcing Wal-Mart to come closer to unionized
standards for medical care, abates the downward pressure Wal-Mart
would otherwise place on those standards in the labor market.
Both Wal-Mart and its critics agree that central to Wal-Mart’s
business model is its militant opposition to unions, opposition which
allows Wal-Mart to pay significantly lower compensation than is paid
by Wal-Mart’s unionized competitors. This compensation differential is
particularly salient as Wal-Mart, through its supercenters, becomes a
dominant force in the grocery industry. “Wal-Mart’s labor cost
advantage looms especially large in the grocery trade, where most big
chains are locked into contracts assuring even their lowest-paid workers
about 20 percent to 30 percent more than their counterparts make at
Wal-Mart.”136
Until recently, the compensation differential between Wal-Mart
and its unionized competitors has presented two choices to the unions
representing employees at those competitors. These unions can
organize Wal-Mart’s workforce to achieve unionized compensation
levels at Wal-Mart or can reduce the compensation paid by Wal-Mart’s
competitors to permit them to compete with Wal-Mart. The first
alternative has so far proved unavailing while the second alternative is
understandably unappealing to unions and their members.
The Act gives Maryland’s unions a third alternative, a statemandated minimum which forces Wal-Mart to come closer to the
compensation packages provided to the unionized workforces of WalMart’s rivals in the marketplace. As I discuss below,137 the Act and
similar state laws present their own dilemmas for unions, dilemmas
135 Gertner, supra note 134, at 45 (estimating that, to pay for the Santa Fe, New Mexico living
wage, “restaurants and hotels and stores would probably need to raise prices between 1 and 3
percent”).
136 BIANCO, supra note 134, at 200-01.
137 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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which, I suggest, explain the Act’s more problematic features. For now,
the point is that Maryland’s unions are, in public choice terms, a second
(perhaps even the primary) beneficiary of the Act insofar as the Act
forces Wal-Mart to move toward the compensation standards prevailing
at Wal-Mart’s unionized competitors. The Act thereby protects
unionized standards for medical care from the downward pressure WalMart would otherwise exert in the labor market by decreasing the
compensation differential between Wal-Mart employees and the
unionized employees of Wal-Mart’s competitors. This, in turn, abates
the competitive pressure on unions to reduce the medical benefits they
have obtained for their members at Wal-Mart’s rivals in the
marketplace.
This vantage helps to explain the AFL-CIO’s strong support for the
Maryland Act and similar laws in other states.138 Unions affiliated with
the AFL-CIO are prime beneficiaries of the Act as the Act protects
unionized compensation standards for health care by diminishing the
differential between Wal-Mart and its unionized competitors. And, as
just observed, the political cost to a Maryland legislator of
accommodating Maryland’s unions via the Act is minimal since those
costs are spread in opaque fashion among an unorganized constituency,
namely, Wal-Mart shoppers.
This vantage also explains why Giant Foods supports the Act.139
Although Giant Foods is a for-profit employer with more than 10,000
Maryland employees, Giant Foods’ medical care outlays exceed twenty
percent of its Maryland payroll, far above the eight percent minimum
required by the Act. By forcing Wal-Mart, a direct grocery competitor
of Giant Foods, to meet that eight percent minimum, the Act reduces
Wal-Mart’s competitive advantage vis-a-vis Giant Foods and, perhaps,
lays the groundwork for a further reduction of that advantage in the
future if the minimum is subsequently increased.
In response to this analysis, I can envision at least two responses
by supporters of the Act, neither of which seems persuasive. First, such
supporters might argue that Wal-Mart will absorb the costs of the Act,
rather than pass those costs onto Wal-Mart’s customers. Second,
supporters of the Act might argue that the magnitude of the cost
imposed on each Wal-Mart customer is small relative to the benefit
obtained by each newly-covered Wal-Mart employee.
138 See AFL-CIO, THE WAL-MART TAX, SHIFTING HEALTH CARE COSTS TO TAXPAYERS
2 (2006),
http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/walmart/upload/walmartreport_031406.pdf
(“Maryland is the first state to hold giant companies such as Wal-Mart accountable for paying
their fair share of workers’ health care costs.”).
139 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fiedler (RILA), 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (D. Md.
2006) (“Giant Food, which actively lobbied for enactment of the legislation, spends substantially
in excess of 8% of the total wages it pays to employees in Maryland on health insurance costs.”);
see also Brandolph, supra note 36.
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It is possible that Wal-Mart, confronted with consumer resistance
to higher prices, will find it economically efficient to absorb some of the
health care costs imposed by the Act. However, as a for-profit firm,
Wal-Mart (or any other covered employer) will shift to its customers as
much of those costs as is economically feasible. Ultimately, it is an
empirical enterprise to identify the elasticity of Wal-Mart consumer
demand and the consequent ability of Wal-Mart to shift the costs of the
Act to its customers in the form of higher prices. However, it is
implausible to assume that Wal-Mart will voluntarily absorb all costs of
the Act and will shift none of those costs to Wal-Mart’s customers.
Indeed, it is more compelling to assume that Wal-Mart, given its
dominance in many markets and product lines, will largely shift the
costs of complying with the Act to Wal-Mart customers.
I am also skeptical that the price impact of the Act on Wal-Mart’s
customers should be dismissed as de minimis. In this context consider
as an alternative to the Act a state income tax surcharge financing
medical coverage.
Assume that this hypothetical surcharge
predominantly falls upon lower-income taxpayers and raises the same
amount as the extra health care costs imposed by the Act on Wal-Mart.
I doubt that many supporters of the Act would embrace such a tax
surcharge. Indeed, I am confident that most of those supporters would
criticize such a surcharge as regressive in impact, as indeed it would be.
However, in distributional terms, the Act and this hypothetical
surcharge are similar. The principal difference between the two is
transparency; the surcharge would be imposed openly on less affluent
taxpayers to finance medical care. In contrast, the economic impact of
the Act on that same group in their capacity as Wal-Mart customers is
hidden since that cost is embedded in Wal-Mart’s prices. If the impact
of the transparent tax surcharge cannot be dismissed as de minimis,
neither should the equivalent effects of the more opaque Act.
B.

The Act’s Long-Run Effects on Employment

While it is plausible to assume that Wal-Mart’s demand for labor is
inelastic in the short-run, it is unconvincing to persist in that assumption
for the long-run. For-profit businesses minimize their costs. Wal-Mart,
in particular, has a hard-earned reputation for finding efficiencies in its
operations.140 For the long-run, Wal-Mart will reduce its now higher140 See, e.g., CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT 8 (2006) (describing Wal-Mart’s
“culture of looking for every penny of cost savings that could be wrung out of designs,
packaging, labor, materials, transportation, even the stocking of stores. It is that cascade of
frugality, questions, and pressure that creates the Wal-Mart effect.”); see also Brannon P.
Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce
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priced Maryland workforce, by substituting capital for labor and by
deploying workers in ways that were inefficient before the Act but that
make sense after the Act raises Wal-Mart’s wage bill.
Figure 3
P

Dc

s1

s

Q2

Q1

Q

Thus, for the long-run, Wal-Mart confronts a downward sloping
demand curve for labor. Figure 3 has the same supply curves as Figure
1, again reflecting Wal-Mart’s labor costs before (S) and after (S1) the
adoption of the Act. However, in Figure 3, the long-run demand curve
for labor, DL, slopes downward since Wal-Mart (or any other covered
employer) will, for the long term, respond to higher prices for labor by
purchasing less labor. For the long-run, Wal-Mart’s Maryland
employment will drop from Q1 before the Act to Q2 after the Act is
adopted.
Some supporters of the Act might acknowledge that Wal-Mart will
employ fewer workers because of the costs imposed by the Act, but
might view reduced employment as a price worth paying to increase the
number of remaining Wal-Mart employees with medical coverage. Not
so fast. Given the minimum mandated by the Act (eight percent of total
payroll), it is possible that the Act could cause a net reduction in the
number of Wal-Mart employees with medical coverage. By reducing
the denominator of the relevant fraction (total payroll), Wal-Mart could
comply with the Act while decreasing the scope of its medical coverage.

Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. LAW. 907, 941 (2005) (“Volume buying enables Wal-Mart to
command preferential pricing from its suppliers, the savings of which are passed along to the
customer.”).
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A numerical example confirms this possibility: Suppose that, prior
to the adoption of the Act, a covered, for-profit employer has 20,000
Maryland employees, that the total annual payroll for this workforce is
$20,000,000, that the covered employer pays $1,200,000 yearly for
employee medical coverage, and that that coverage extends to 4,000
employees. On these numbers, the employer flunks the Act’s test since
the employer only devotes six percent of total payroll to medical care.141
Suppose further that, after the Act is adopted, the employer,
responding to the now-higher price for Maryland labor, reduces its
Maryland workforce to 14,000 employees, that 200 of the employees
terminated had medical coverage, that the cost of such coverage
consequently drops to $1,120,000 and that the total payroll for this nowreduced workforce declines to $14,000,000.
In this hypothetical, the employer, by reducing its workforce and
payroll, complies with the Maryland Act since the employer’s reduced
medical costs ($1,120,000) satisfy the statutorily-required eight percent
of total payroll ($14,000,000). Even though total medical outlays and
the number of covered employees have both declined, total payroll has
declined relatively more. The covered employer has thus complied with
the Act, not by extending medical coverage, but by reducing its payroll.
In a world of unintended consequences, a scenario along these lines
cannot be dismissed. Indeed, Maryland’s Attorney General cites this
possibility in his defense of the Act from ERISA preemption.142
In any event, a long-run increase in employee medical coverage,
should it occur, will be purchased by sacrificing the jobs of some
persons who otherwise would be employed by Wal-Mart and by
increasing prices for Wal-Mart customers. Consequently, for the longrun, the Act engenders a trade-off between the consumer welfare of
Wal-Mart’s predominantly low-income customers and the well-being of
Wal-Mart’s comparably unaffluent workforce. To the extent the costs
of the Act are shifted forward to Wal-Mart’s customers in the form of
141 $1,200,000/$20,000,000=6%. Note that, if this employer is a nonprofit entity, it passes
muster under the Maryland Act, which imposes a lesser requirement on nonprofit employers. As
I discuss infra Part IV.E, there is no policy justification for this lesser standard for large
nonprofits.
142 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 3 (Wal-Mart can comply with the Maryland
Act by “reduc[ing] the number of employees it has in the State [or] reduc[ing] pay . . . .”) The
Attorney General argues that these possibilities indicate that the Act is not ERISA-preempted.
For the reasons discussed in the text, I disagree, i.e., under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85 (1983), the Act refers to and has a connection with Wal-Mart’s ERISA-regulated medical
plans; under N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995), the Act mandates Wal-Mart’s level of medical outlays and impairs nationally
uniform administration; under the reasoned textualist approach, the Act intrudes upon Wal-Mart’s
zone of welfare plan autonomy by regulating medical plan participation and funding.
Nevertheless, I agree with the Attorney General that Wal-Mart might respond to the Act by
reducing Maryland employment or compensation, even though I disagree with the Attorney
General as to the legal implications of that possibility.
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higher prices, jobs are preserved at the expense of those customers. To
the extent the costs of the Act are shifted back to the persons who would
otherwise have worked for Wal-Mart, customers are spared higher
prices but those unemployed persons bear the impact of the Act in the
form of lost job opportunities. A particularly ironic possibility is that
some of these unemployed persons, who otherwise would have worked
at Wal-Mart and been covered by Wal-Mart’s medical plans, will
instead utilize Maryland’s Medicaid program. There is, as the old
proverb has it, no free lunch.
In contemporary debate about “living wage” proposals, many
advocates of such proposals deny that there is any reduction of
employment when such proposals are enacted. In effect, these
advocates suggest that Figure 1 with its inelastic demand curve for labor
reflects, not just the short-run, but the long-run as well. No doubt, there
are defenders of the Maryland Act who believe this also and who deny
that the Act will have any impact on Wal-Mart’s employment in
Maryland.
I find this characterization of Wal-Mart’s long-term demand for
labor implausible. But, in any event, even if this characterization is
correct, it poses a dilemma for supporters of the Act. If Wal-Mart’s
demand for labor is indeed inelastic for the long-run, the Act will not
diminish Wal-Mart’s Maryland employment but, instead, the costs of
the Act will be shifted onto Wal-Mart’s mostly unaffluent customers in
the form of higher prices.
Again, the question must be asked: Would the Maryland legislature
have openly voted for a transparent program achieving this result, such
as a tax surcharge impacting principally on lower income persons? I
doubt it. As noted earlier,143 public choice theory suggests a favorable
political calculation underlying the Act. Legislators, through the Act,
bestow perceptible largesse upon their Maryland constituents who work
for Wal-Mart and who obtain medical coverage because of the Act.
Legislators, through the Act, also advantage unions which benefit from
the Act insofar as the Act protects unionized compensation standards by
forcing Wal-Mart to come closer to the medical care coverage such
unions have negotiated at Wal-Mart’s competitors. The costs of this
largesse, embedded in Wal-Mart’s prices, will largely be obscured from
most Wal-Mart customers who pay it. Quite probably, many of those
customers live outside of Maryland. In pure political terms, this is an
attractive trade-off: grateful voters and unions receiving benefits,
largely ignorant (often out-of-state) consumers bearing the costs.
In contrast, a tax surcharge, or other more transparent proposal in
lieu of the Act, changes the political calculus. Those paying the taxes
143

See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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for increased medical coverage are more likely to perceive the costs
inflicted upon them.
Behavioral economics144 suggests a more benign explanation for
the Maryland legislature’s willingness to adopt the Act, but not an
equivalent tax surcharge. From this perspective, some legislators
succumb to “framing effects,” viewing economically comparable
programs as substantively different depending upon the way those
programs are framed. Such legislators may genuinely, if naively, view
the Act as different from an economically comparable tax program.
In enacting the Act, the Maryland legislature likely had some
members who made the political calculation predicted by public choice
theory while others were the financially naive decision makers of
behavioral economics. The members of a legislative majority need not
reason to their respective results in the same way.
Consider finally the possibility that Wal-Mart will shift the costs of
the Act to Wal-Mart’s suppliers by demanding lower prices to offset
those costs. Wal-Mart is well-known for the pricing pressure it exerts
on the companies that sell to it.145 Perhaps the costs of the Act will
ultimately be passed on to those companies in the form of Wal-Mart’s
demand for even lower prices.
I doubt that many (perhaps any) supporters of the Act intend for
the costs of that law to be foisted onto Wal-Mart’s suppliers. WalMart’s often-brutal price pressure on its suppliers is one of the most
compelling elements of the anti-Wal-Mart narrative.146 It is unlikely
that the Maryland legislators who voted for the Act sought complicity in
this aspect of Wal-Mart’s business model.
Nevertheless, at first blush, Wal-Mart’s customers and employees
will be spared the costs of the Act if Wal-Mart can pass those costs to
its suppliers in the form of even lower prices as the precondition for
selling to Wal-Mart. On second thought, however, this merely moves
the costs of the Act onto the suppliers’ employees and non-Wal-Mart
customers who, in turn, will themselves engage in further cost-shifting.
The ultimate impact of the Act is thus opaque and likely quite
regressive, particularly insofar as the costs of the Act fall upon the
nonaffluent employees of Wal-Mart’s suppliers in the form of reduced
wages and decreased employment.

144 Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA.
TAX REV. 797 (2005).
145 BIANCO, supra note 134, at 182 (“For suppliers, doing business with Bentonville is a
Faustian bargain.”).
146 Id.
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Alternatives to the Act: State Earned Income Tax Credits

It is instructive to compare the Maryland Act with the alternatives
available to legislators seeking to assist low-income workers in
Maryland and in other states. Chief among these alternatives is the
expansion (or establishment) of state earned income tax credits (EITCs)
for such workers. This comparison confirms the superiority of the tax
credit to the Act as a device for helping less affluent workers.
States’ EITCs are modeled on the federal EITC147 and usually
piggy-back on the federal credit. Maryland’s EITC is typical, pegged at
the lesser of fifty percent of the taxpayer’s federal EITC or the
taxpayer’s Maryland income tax liability.148 The credit constitutes both
financial support from the public fisc and a reward for work since the
credit is bestowed only on low-income taxpayers who have earned
income. Since the EITC is financed by the public treasury, rather than
by private businesses, the credit does not distort business behavior,
forcing firms to raise prices, to reduce employment, or some of both.
Such credits, financed by state income tax revenues, are (unlike the Act)
funded by middle- and upper-income taxpayers, not by less affluent
Wal-Mart shoppers paying higher prices.
The Maryland legislature, if it seeks additional succor for lowincome workers, could increase the size of the Maryland EITC, now
limited to half of the federal credit. Maryland, for example, could
enlarge its credit to, say, seventy percent of the federal credit to which
the taxpayer is entitled. Alternatively (or in addition), the Maryland
legislature could eliminate the ceiling which caps the Maryland credit at
the taxpayer’s Maryland income tax liability. Maryland could instead
make its EITC, like the federal credit, refundable. Thus, if the credit
exceeds the taxpayer’s Maryland tax liability, the Maryland treasury
would send the taxpayer a check for the excess.
States like Connecticut, which lack a state EITC, could amend
their respective income tax statutes to include such a credit.149
Why would a Maryland legislator, concerned about the welfare of
low-income workers, prefer the Act to an expansion of the EITC? On
the merits, the EITC prevails in any comparison. The EITC applies to
all low-income workers, not just to those hired by a particular firm. The
credit does not dampen employment nor is it paid for by persons who
themselves are struggling financially.
147
148
149

I.R.C. § 32 (2000).
MD. CODE. ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-704(b) (West 2006).
See, e.g., S.B. 135, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006) (introduced on February
16, 2006 by Sen. Looney proposing a refundable EITC for Connecticut); H.B. 5413, 2006 Gen.
Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006) (introduced on February 17, 2006 by Rep. O’Brien proposing
an EITC for Connecticut).
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On the negative side of the ledger, the EITC has proved complex
and difficult to administer.150 On the other hand, important laws are
often complicated and hard to implement.151 Moreover, in a case like
Maryland’s, the basic administrative costs of implementing the EITC
are already incurred at the credit’s current level. While those
administrative costs might increase somewhat if the credit is expanded
or made refundable, those incremental administrative costs do not seem
significant.
Some supporters of the Act no doubt feel that the state should force
low-income workers to take their compensation in the form of medical
care rather than cash. But even that objection to an expanded EITC
could be met by allocating EITC refunds to state-administered medical
accounts upon which each low-income worker could draw for health
care for him and his dependents.
From this comparison, the Act emerges as an essentially symbolic
gesture, politically attractive because bashing Wal-Mart is a good sound
bite today and because the Act’s costs are largely obscured from those
who pay such costs as higher prices and reduced long-run employment.
In contrast to the Act, expanding or establishing the state EITC is a
politically-accountable action since the legislature, reducing tax
collections via an enlarged credit, must in response either decrease
public spending or raise other revenues. As a device to help the
working poor, expanding (or establishing) a state EITC wins hands
down.
The EITC is not the only option available to Maryland’s legislators
if they seek to go beyond symbolism and genuinely assist Maryland’s
working poor. Another compelling model is the federal tax credit for
low-income workers who contribute to individual retirement accounts,
401(k) plans and similar arrangements.152 Maryland (or any other state)
could easily adapt that model to provide broad tax-based assistance to
low-income workers to help them defray their outlays for medical
insurance premiums and co-payments.
In short, if the legislature of Maryland (or of any other state) seeks
to provide broad assistance to the working poor, there are good options,
150 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54
EMORY L.J. 755, 767 (2005) (“EITC errors are made by taxpayers, tax preparers, and IRS staff.”);
see also Dustin Stamper, Treasury, IRS Programs Get Fair Marks on New OMB Report Card,
110 TAX NOTES 699 (2006) (“The credit has long been a lightning rod for criticism for both its
high alleged abuse rates and the number of eligible taxpayers who do not claim it.”).
151 For example, the Homestead Act, justly celebrated as one of the great success stories of
American history, had more than its share of administrative problems. See LOUIS S. WARREN,
BUFFALO BILL’S AMERICA: WILLIAM CODY AND THE WILD WEST SHOW 72 (2005) (“Settlers
had their own share of tricks. After 1862, the federal government deeded 285 million acres to
homesteaders. Half their claims were fraudulent, backed by false identities, fake improvements,
or worse.”).
152 I.R.C. § 25B.
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options preferable to the Act. When the Act is compared with possible
tax credits to help low income individuals and families, the Act emerges
as an essentially symbolic gesture, rather than a carefully-crafted
program to help the poor.
D.

The Design of the Act

The final policy argument against the Act is the Act’s poor design.
Assume for purposes of this discussion a decision in favor of statemandated, employer-provided medical insurance.153 Given the decision
to pursue this course, the Act implements it quite poorly.
We have already seen154 how the Act creates a perverse incentive
for a covered employer to decrease its total payroll, thereby elevating its
current (or even reduced) medical outlays to the statutory requirement,
eight percent of total payroll.
Other features of the Act are equally problematic. A covered
employer under the Act is one with 10,000 or more Maryland
employees. There is no pretense here that the Act mandates broad
medical coverage for the Maryland workforce. The Act is a
gerrymander, narrowly targeted to reach Wal-Mart and Wal-Mart alone.
If the Maryland legislature seriously believes that Maryland should
require employer-financed medical care, why should Maryland not
mandate such care for employees of smaller firms? Why establish the
threshold for mandated health coverage at 10,000 employees? Why not
at 5000 employees? Or 1000 employees? Why exempt other large
firms and just concentrate on Wal-Mart? Except for Wal-Mart’s
symbolic attractiveness, there is no reason for the Act’s arbitrary
coverage.
Equally arbitrary is the Act’s mandate that a covered employer
must expend at least eight percent of total payroll for medical care.
Again, the Maryland legislature adopted this number because Wal-Mart
falls below this statutory threshold while other firms the legislature
chose to spare already exceed it.
Particularly intriguing in this respect is the special rule for
nonprofit employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees. Under
the Act, these nonprofit firms need devote only six percent of total
payroll to medical care. In practice, this special treatment for large
nonprofit employers extends to a single institution, Johns Hopkins
153 Massachusetts has adopted a comprehensive statute which, in sharp contrast to Maryland’s
narrowly-targeted Wal-Mart Act, attempts to establish universal health care coverage. See H.B.
4479, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); see also Pam Belluck & Katie Zezima,
Massachusetts Legislation on Insurance Becomes Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at A13.
154 See discussion supra Part IV.B.

892

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

University, the only Maryland nonprofit that employs 10,000 or more
employees.155 By virtue of the lower requirement (six percent of
payroll) applying to it, Johns Hopkins need not expand its medical
coverage while Wal-Mart must. Why, it must be asked, is a clerk
employed by Johns Hopkins less worthy of state-mandated employerfinanced medical care than is a clerk engaged by Wal-Mart?
In public choice terms, there are two (mutually compatible)
explanations for the arbitrary decisions embodied in the Act. First,
exempting Maryland’s other major employers dampened or deflected
such employers’ potential opposition to the Act.
The second
explanation stems from the dilemma confronting the unions embracing
the Act as a device that protects unionized compensation standards
against Wal-Mart’s downward pressure in the marketplace.156
On the one hand, these unions desire the Act as a state-mandated
floor that reduces the differential between Wal-Mart’s compensation
standards and the higher, unionized standards prevailing at Wal-Mart’s
competitors. On the other hand, these unions do not want the state to
displace them as the guarantors of their members’ compensation
packages. If Maryland, by statute, assures everyone in Maryland of
employer-provided health care, collective bargaining for such care
becomes superfluous.
Thus, the unions want an Act that solves (or at least abates) their
Wal-Mart problem by lifting Wal-Mart’s compensation package closer
to unionized standards, thereby reducing the pressure on the unions to
make concessions. However, the unions do not want an Act which
extends any further than Wal-Mart since they want the collective
bargaining the unions provide (not the legislature) to be the forum to
which their members look for compensation improvements.
Ultimately, the nicest characterization of the Act is that it is a
jumble of compromises, reflecting the rough-and-tumble of practical
politics and Wal-Mart’s symbolic attractiveness as a target. Less
diplomatically, as a matter of policy, the Act’s design makes no sense.
E.

Summary

In a world without ERISA preemption, the Maryland Act would
still be ill-conceived. As a matter of policy, the Act imposes its costs on
Wal-Mart’s predominantly low-income customers who will pay higher
prices because of the Act and on workers who would, but for the Act,
155 See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that the only Maryland
employers with more than 10,000 employees are “Giant Food, Wal-Mart, and Johns Hopkins
University”).
156 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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have jobs with Wal-Mart. A legislature genuinely seeking to improve
the condition of the working poor has available better-crafted
alternatives, including expansion (or establishment) of the state EITC.
On the merits, it is difficult to view the narrowly-targeted, poorlydesigned Act as other than an exercise in political symbolism.
CONCLUSION
Under any of the plausible approaches to ERISA Section 514(a),
ERISA preempts the Maryland “Wal-Mart” law and other laws like it.
While I favor a world in which Maryland (or any other state) is free to
experiment in the area of employer-provided health care, that is not the
legal world as it exists today. As a matter of law, Section 514(a), as it
has been and as it could reasonably be construed, precludes state
legislation like the Maryland Act. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland decided correctly when it held the Maryland Act to
be ERISA-preempted.
As a matter of policy, the Maryland statute is ill-conceived. The
Maryland legislature would not, in lieu of the Act, have adopted a
politically transparent program (such as a tax surcharge) with similar
impact upon lower-income persons. Maryland and other states have far
more compelling options for assisting low-income workers including
expansion of state earned income tax credits. In the final analysis,
Maryland’s Wal-Mart statute is a poorly-designed exercise in political
symbolism, not a carefully-crafted response to the urgent problem of
health care in America.

